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LABELING PROGRAMS AS A 
REASONABLY AVAILABLE LEAST 
RESTRICTIVE TRADE MEASURE 
UNDER ARTICLE XX’S NEXUS 
REQUIREMENT 
John J. Emslie∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
roduct labels, as the term is used throughout this Article, 
are labels placed on the outside of a product which illus-
trate the product’s effects on the environment or human health.1 
The use of product labels by manufacturers, producers, and 
packagers as a method to communicate such information is in-
creasing in international trade.  It is nearly impossible to walk 
through a local store or supermarket and not see dozens of la-
bels affixed to a variety of products.  Some producers voluntar-
ily place labels on their products to communicate the positive 
effect the product may have on the environment or human life 
or health, for example, “made from recycled paper.”  Other pro-
ducers are required to place a label on their products that warn 
customers of certain dangers, for example, “this product con-
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 1. The term “product label” could be used to define almost every form of 
communication placed on a product’s packaging, i.e. advertisements, price 
tags, the ubiquitous nutritional information labels which are required on all 
food fit for consumption in the United States, etc.  This Article, for the sake of 
brevity, limits the definition of product labels to those labels which communi-
cate a product’s effects on the environment and human heath.  Such labels are 
commonly referred to as “eco-labels” and “health warnings.”  Hereinafter, the 
terms “labels” and “labeling programs” will exclusively refer to labels and 
labeling programs which are implemented to communicate a product’s effects 
on the environment or human life or health.    
P 
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tains ozone-depleting substances” or “cigarette smoke contains 
carbon monoxide.”  However, regardless of the message or its 
impetus, product labels are likely to become an important com-
ponent of international trade and international law.  This Arti-
cle presents the argument that product labeling programs could 
become a default or catch-all reasonably available least restric-
tive trade measure under Article XX of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).2 
Part II of this Article further defines product labels and ex-
plains the three principal categories of labeling programs.  
These programs are mandatory government sponsored schemes, 
voluntary government sponsored schemes, and voluntary pri-
vately-sponsored schemes.  Additionally, Part II demonstrates 
the advantages and disadvantages of labels and labeling pro-
grams.  Generally, labeling programs provide advantages to the 
consumer, business and manufacturing sectors.  Labeling pro-
gram disadvantages include a labeling program’s potential for 
abuse, the potential inconsistency and inaccuracy of labels, and 
the increased costs associated with poorly-managed or regu-
lated labeling programs.   
Part III sets forth the dispute settlement mechanism of the 
GATT/World Trade Organization (WTO), the forum under 
which disputes involving Article XX are decided.  Generally, 
under the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system, a complain-
ing party requests a panel to be established to hear the dispute 
and prepare a report.  The panel then applies regime rules to 
the facts of the dispute, which results in a binding decision that 
is reviewed by the Appellate Body.  Part III also explains and 
provides an analysis of three major provisions of the GATT: Ar-
ticle I: General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment; Article III: 
National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation; and, 
Article XI: General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions.   
  
 2. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS – RESULTS OF THE 
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].  
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the exclusive organization dealing 
with international trade among its Member nations.  See WTO Website, at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm (last visited Feb. 
19, 2005).  Currently, there are 148 Members of the WTO.  For a listing of all 
Members and their date of membership, see WTO Website, at http://www.wto. 
org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2005). 
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Part IV analyzes Article XX of the GATT.  Generally, Article 
XX provides a limited exception to GATT’s default rules, which 
permit a trading Member to institute a trade restriction if the 
restriction is necessary to protect, inter alia, human, animal or 
plant life or health, or the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources. Part IV explains the three-step Article XX analysis 
established by recent GATT/WTO decisions: (1) the policy test; 
(2) the nexus requirement; and (3) the chapeau.  A trading 
Member must satisfy each of these requirements in order to 
successfully invoke an Article XX defense.  The Shrimp Turtle 
dispute, discussed at length in this Part, provides a perfect ex-
ample of the Article XX exception analysis.   
Part V focuses upon the principal GATT/WTO decisions that 
have confronted the issue of product labels and labeling.  The 
Thai Cigarettes dispute between the United States and Thai-
land, the EC Asbestos dispute between Canada and the Euro-
pean Communities (EC), and the Tuna I dispute between the 
United States and Mexico all discussed the legality and avail-
ability of labeling programs under Article XX.  Each of the 
situations presented was factually distinct and, therefore, the 
decisions concerning the availability of a labeling program as a 
least restrictive trade alternative were different in the disputes.   
Part VI concludes that it may be possible for labeling pro-
grams to develop into a default or catchall least restrictive trade 
measure under Article XX.  However, such a labeling program 
must possess certain attributes and characteristics, which are 
explored in this section.  For example, the labeling program 
must be effective, international support or agreement must ex-
ist, and, finally, the program must be reasonably fair to all trad-
ing Members.  These characteristics were developed by the 
panel and Appellate Body reports discussed throughout the Ar-
ticle.     
II.  LABELING PROGRAMS 
Put simply, a product label is a label placed on the outside of 
a product that communicates various information about the 
product, whether it be the product’s composition, production 
method, or the possible effects the product has on the environ-
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ment, or human health.3  The information may be negative, 
positive, or neutral.  A labeling program establishes the re-
quirements or conditions that a producer must satisfy to place a 
label on the product.  Labeling programs may exist on a domes-
tic, regional, or international level.  There are three major types 
of labeling programs: (1) mandatory government-sponsored pro-
grams; (2) voluntary government-sponsored programs; and (3) 
voluntary private-sponsored programs.  Labeling programs pro-
vide advantages to both the consumer and business and manu-
facturing sectors.  However, the proliferation of labeling pro-
grams has resulted in some well-founded criticisms as well.  
Specifically, if not adequately monitored and regulated, labeling 
programs present the potential for abuse, labels may be incon-
sistent and inaccurate, and producers fear the increased costs 
associated with labeling programs.   
A.  Defining Labels and Labeling Programs 
Product labels are typically labels placed on the outside of a 
product that contain information concerning the product’s po-
tential effect on the environment, human, animal or plant life.4  
However, labels may also be affixed to products in an effort to 
pursue other socially-conscious goals, such as the eradication of 
child labor.5  Environmental labels, which are gaining popular-
ity, are labels that communicate the product's interaction with 
the environment.6  These labels communicate to the consumer 
  
 3. Matthias Vogt, Environmental Labelling and Certification Schemes: A 
Modern Way to Green the World or GATT/WTO – Illegal Trade Barrier?, 33 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10522 (2003).  See also Elliot B. Staffin, Trade Barrier or Trade 
Boon? A Critical Evaluation of Environmental Labeling and its Role in the 
“Greening” of World Trade, 21 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 205, 206–20 (1996) (dis-
cussing the use of labels to warn consumers about human health and envi-
ronmental issues, production methods, and the effects of the product on plant 
and animal species). 
 4. Atsuko Okubo, Environmental Labeling Programs and the GATT/WTO 
Regime, 11 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 599, 601 (1999). 
 5. See Janelle M. Diller & David A. Levy, Child Labor, Trade and Invest-
ment: Toward the Harmonization of International Law,  91 AM. J. INT’L L. 663, 
680 (1997) (discussing GATT and the potential use of product labeling in the 
context of child labor).  See also discussion of RUGMARK, infra notes 19–24 
and accompanying text. 
 6. Teresa Hock, Note, The Role of Eco-labels in International Trade: Can 
Timber Certification be Implemented as a Means to Deforestation?, 12 COLO. J. 
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that use of the product may adversely effect the environment or, 
conversely, that the product is more friendly to the environment 
than its competitors’.7   
Labels are not basic standard requirements for products.  In-
stead, basic standards are the minimum requirements for a 
product being commercialized in a given country.8   Conversely, 
labeling programs do not pose “internal requirements” on the 
product (i.e., the minimum composition and/or ingredients the 
product must contain for it to be sold to the public), but rather 
impose an “external requirement” (i.e., a requirement as to 
which information must be contained on the label).   
One common category of product labels, environmental labels, 
has become more prominent in the United States and Europe 
where consumers have expressed greater concern about the ef-
fects that industrialization and consumption patterns have on 
the environment.9  The information usually communicated to 
the consumer on an environmental label is that the particular 
product is, for example, more environmentally friendly than 
other products in the same category.10  For example, a label that 
explains that the product contains organically-grown ingredi-
ents conveys the message that such a product is more environ-
mentally friendly than products that use pesticides and other 
chemical treatments.   
Environmental labels often transmit messages to consumers 
that promote the consumption and production of alternative 
products that are more environmentally friendly than products 
currently used by the market.11  For example, a label may be 
placed on reusable canvas shopping bags that explains that the 
  
INT'L ENVTL. L & POL'Y 347, 350 (2001) (noting the increased popularity of 
environmental labels among countries, especially in Japan, Canada, and in 
Europe).   
 7. Markku Lehtonen, Criteria in Environmental Labelling: A Compara-
tive Analysis of Environmental Criteria in Selected Labelling Schemes, United 
Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), 13 ENV’T AND TRADE 7 (1997) 
(citing the UNCTAD Ad hoc Working Group on Trade, Environment and De-
velopment’s definition of environmental labeling). 
 8. See Henrique Freire de Oliveira Souza, Genetically Modified Plants: A 
Need for International Regulation, 6 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 129, 163 
(2000). 
 9. Lehtonen, supra note 7, at 8. 
 10. Id. at 10. 
 11. Okubo, supra note 4, at 601. 
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use of such bags is more environmentally friendly than the use 
of paper or plastic bags currently used by grocery stores.  Thus, 
the producer, through use of a label, could either attempt to set 
itself apart from its own product class (i.e., with the use of a 
biodegradable container)  or it can promote the environmentally 
friendly aspects of the entire class versus another class of prod-
ucts (i.e., canvas bags versus paper and plastic bags).  There-
fore, the most proper definition is a “catchall,” one that defines 
labels and labeling programs as a “range of labels” used to 
communicate information about a product to the consumer.12      
Labeling programs exist on a domestic, international, or re-
gional level.  An example of a domestic labeling program is the 
dolphin-safe label on tuna and tuna products in the United 
States.13  A typical international labeling program is that estab-
lished by the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO).14   The ISO is a network of national standards institutes 
from 147 countries, working in partnership with international 
organizations, governments, industry, business, and consumer 
representatives.15  The ISO provides standards and guidelines 
for environmental labeling.16  These guidelines are typically re-
ferred to as ELP.17   In addition, various United Nations Confer-
ences have directly supported labeling programs.18  
  
 12. Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development 
(FIELD), Briefing Paper: Legal and Policy Issues in the Market Access Impli-
cations of Labelling for Environmental Purposes, Sub-Regional Brainstorming 
Workshop (Asia) - Specific Trade and Environment Issues in Paragraphs 31 
and 32 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration in Preparation for the Cancun 
WTO Ministerial Conference, 4 (July 30, 2003 – Aug. 1, 2003) [hereinafter 
FIELD Briefing Paper] (discussing environmental labels in particular). 
 13. Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §1385 
(1990).  This act specifies the labeling standard for any tuna product exported 
from or offered for sale in the United States. 
 14. See generally ISO Website, at http://www.iso.org/iso/en/ISOOnline.open 
erpage (last visited Nov. 20, 2004).  
 15. Id.  
 16. Doris Gaskell Nuyda, Eco-labeled Goods Will Soon be in Local Markets, 
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, Apr. 25, 2003.  ISO 14000 contains International 
Standards for Environmental Management.  See ISO Website, ISO 14000, at 
http://www.iso.ch/iso/en/iso9000-14000/iso14000/iso14000index.html (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2004).   
 17. Nuyda, supra note 16.   
To obtain an ELP certification, a company or manufacturer must first 
apply to the ELP administrator who processes the forms and ar-
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An example of a regional labeling program would be the 
RUGMARK program.19  RUGMARK is a nonprofit organization 
that works to end child labor and offers educational opportuni-
ties for children in Nepal, India and Pakistan.20  RUGMARK 
recruits producers and importers of carpets to make and sell 
carpets that are free from illegal child labor.21  Producers agree 
to adhere to RUGMARK’s strict no child-labor guidelines and 
permit random inspections of carpet looms.  In doing so, 
RUGMARK grants the producers the right to place the 
RUGMARK label on their carpets.  RUGMARK contends that 
this system provides the best assurance that children were not 
employed in the making of the carpet.22  In addition, a portion of 
the carpet price is contributed to the rehabilitation and educa-
tion of former child weavers.23   
The RUGMARK labeling program is very similar to environ-
mental and health-related labeling programs in that it shares 
similar implementation, influence, philosophy, and underlying 
  
ranges the site visiting and product testing by technical experts.  If 
the experts’ assessment is favorable, the ELP administrator then de-
clares the product as having passed.  The ELP board gives it approval 
and the label or certification is awarded to the applicant.  It takes 
about two months to process applications. 
Id. 
 18. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT 
AND DEVELOPMENT, at 38–39, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. 1), U.N. 
Sales No. E.93.I.8 (1993).  Chapter 4(B)(c) related to assisting individuals and 
households in making environmentally sound purchasing decisions states:  
4.21 Governments, in cooperation with industry and other relevant 
groups, should encourage expansion of environmental labeling and 
other environmentally related product information programmes de-
signed to assist consumers to make informed choices.   
4.22 They should also encourage the emergence of an informed con-
sumer public and assist individuals and households to make envi-
ronmentally informed choices by ... (b) Making consumers aware of 
the health and environmental impact of products, through such 
means as consumer legislation and environmental labelling.  
Id. 
 19. See generally RUGMARK Foundation, at http://www.rugmark.org (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2005).   
 20. See RUGMARK Foundation, About RUGMARK, at http://www.rugm 
ark.org/about.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2005). 
 21. See id. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See id.   
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“socially friendly” intention.  First, with its similarities to envi-
ronmental and health-related labeling programs, its ingenuity 
and success reinforces the argument of the need for a cohesive 
and standardized labeling program.24  Second, it demonstrates 
that worldwide acceptance of labeling programs and their po-
tential international success makes labeling programs applica-
ble not only to the protection of the environment and human 
health, but also to other important objectives such as human 
rights and various other socially friendly goals.  Therefore, it is 
possible that in the future successful labeling programs may be 
extended to a wealth of other causes, where demand shifts gen-
erated by socially conscious consumers having access to the in-
formation contained on the labels can affect the supply of other 
socially friendly products to the detriment of socially unfriendly 
products.   
The goals of a labeling program are fairly straightforward.  
Generally, the purpose of a labeling program is to increase de-
mand for environmentally friendly or more health-conscious 
products with the hope that the products will gain a larger 
market share.25  The labels placed on tuna and tuna products 
  
 24. It has been documented that RUGMARK inspectors rescue, on average, 
one child carpet weaver per week, and RUGMARK is viewed internationally 
as a model program for the eradication of child labor. Press Release, National 
Consumers League, NCL to U.S. Retailers: Stop Ignoring Child Slaves in Car-
pet Industry (Mar. 26, 2001), available at http://www.nclnet.org/news/2001/ 
carpet_child_labor.htm (outlining RUGMARK’s success story.)  
 25. See Staffin, supra note 3, at 209: 
While there are many different types of environmental labeling 
schemes, they all share a common goal: to identify for the consumer 
those products that are environmentally less harmful than other 
competing goods within the same product category, either because of 
their ingredients, the PPMs by which they were generated, or both, 
so that the consumer will become motivated to purchase only these 
‘green’ goods, thereby increasing the ‘green’ producer’s market share 
to the detriment of its competitors.   
Id. 
  PPMs are “Processing and Production Methods.”  They “concern the 
way in which products are manufactured or processed and natural resources 
are extracted or harvested, and are often the basis for national regulations.”  
Elizabeth Barham, What’s in a Name?: Eco-Labelling in the Global Food Sys-
tem, Paper Presented at the Joint Meetings of the Agriculture, Food, and Hu-
man Values Society and the Association for the Study of Food and Society, 
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are a perfect illustration of this technique and its success.  Al-
though the American embargo on Mexican tuna was lifted in 
1999 in response to the GATT panel’s decision in the Tuna I 
dispute,26 since U.S. law prevents Mexican tuna from being la-
beled Dolphin Safe, virtually no retailer in the United States 
will stock it.27  In addition, labeling programs hope that provid-
ing certain information to the public will “serve as a normative 
process to influence and shape international behavior over time, 
with a goal of sustainable development.”28 
Therefore, labeling programs are usually designed to achieve 
four basic goals: “(i) to improve the sale or image of the labelled 
product; (ii) to raise the environmental [or health-conscious] 
awareness of consumers; (iii) to provide accurate and timely 
information for consumers to make informed judgments; and, 
(iv) to direct manufacturers to account for the … impact of their 
products.”29  However, the manner in which these labeling pro-
grams meet these goals and the compliance level attributed to 
each of these programs depends on the way in which these pro-
grams are structured.   
B. Types of Labeling Programs   
To date, there are at least thirty different labeling programs 
implemented in forty different countries worldwide, each bear-
ing its own, sometimes intriguing, name.30  Germany’s is called 
Blue Angel, Japan’s program is Eco Mark, Canada’s is Envi-
ronmental Choice, and, in the United States, it is Green Seal.31  
The degree of governmental oversight and regulation varies 
from country to country and among organizations.32  There are 
  
held in Madison, Wisconsin, June 5–8 (1997), available at http://www.pmac. 
net/bbarham.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2005). 
 26. For a full discussion of the Tuna I dispute, including the panel’s deci-
sion, see infra notes 180–194 and accompanying text. 
 27. See Tangled Nets, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 4, 2003, at 38.  This fact is 
especially interesting considering that tuna demand is increasing worldwide. 
Id. 
 28. Okubo, supra note 4, at 601. 
 29. FIELD Briefing Paper, supra note 12, at 5.  
 30. Nuyda, supra note 16.   
 31. Id.  
 32. For example, sometimes environmental labels are based on a tool 
known as a life cycle assessment (LCA), which is a “method in which the envi-
ronmental effects of a particular product are evaluated by analysis of the in-
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three main categories of labeling programs: (1) mandatory gov-
ernment-sponsored schemes; (2) voluntary government-
sponsored schemes; and (3) voluntary private-sponsored 
schemes.33 
1. Mandatory Government-Sponsored Schemes 
Under a mandatory government-sponsored scheme, producers 
are required to attach labels to their products which convey ei-
ther the negative, neutral, or positive contents or effects of their 
products.34 
The primary purpose of a program requiring the labeling of 
negative content is to warn consumers of the adverse effect such 
a product may have on human health or the environment.  The 
aspirations of such a program are to persuade manufacturers to 
switch to a more “friendly” or “healthy” process or, instead, have 
the consumer avoid the product altogether and find an alterna-
tive.35  One example of such a scheme is the U.S. Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990.36  The amendments were made in re-
sponse to the highly successful Montreal Protocol37 and were 
intended to get the United States in compliance with the Proto-
col.  The Clean Air Act requires:  
the labeling of any product that contains or was manufactured 
with certain chemical substances known to deplete the strato-
spheric ozone layer....The required label must read: “Warning: 
Contains [or Manufactured with] [name of substance], a sub-
  
puts and outputs of materials and energy and other important factors related 
to the product.”  FIELD Briefing Paper, supra note 12, at 5.  Although not all 
programs apply a comprehensive LCA, the recent trend supports its inclusion 
or a similar technique.  Id. at 5–6. 
 33. Okubo, supra note 4, at 603. 
 34. Id.  
 35. See Staffin, supra note 3, at 211.  
 36. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. 101–549, Title VI, § 602(a), 104 Stat. 2649 
(1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7671 (1994), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/air/caa/title6.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2005).   
 37. See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 
Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1550 (1987) (entered 
into force Jan. 1, 1989).  The purpose of the Montreal Protocol was to elimi-
nate substances that cause ozone depletion by instituting a total phase out of 
such products.  See id. pmbl.   
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stance which harms public health and the environment by de-
stroying ozone in the upper atmosphere.”38   
The primary purpose of a neutral labeling program is to pro-
vide consumers with information that is not necessarily nega-
tive or positive, but would be considered valuable information to 
the consumer in his or her decision making.  The label is neu-
tral because the information provided may not be sufficiently 
material to generate a negative or positive response per se.  For 
example, in the United States, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) requires car manufacturers to place a sticker on 
the window of a new automobile stating the fuel economy the 
consumer can expect from the car.39 
The positive type of labeling program allows a producer to 
place a label on the product illustrating the product’s positive 
feature, as compared to other products in the same category.  
An example of this program is the labeling of tuna and tuna 
products in the United States.40  This label allows the producer 
to communicate the lengths taken to ensure that the product 
was produced with positive environmental intention.  Although 
these products often cost more than products that do not bear 
the label, the seller is hoping to “cash in” on the environmen-
tally or health conscious segment of the market, thereby gain-
ing an economic advantage.41 
2. Voluntary Government-Sponsored Labeling Schemes 
Voluntary government-sponsored labeling schemes vary 
greatly in content.42  These programs involve government par-
ticipation in the formation, administration, and sometimes fi-
  
 38. Staffin, supra note 3, at 211–12 (discussing the Clean Air Act).   
 39. Fuel Economy Regulations for 1977 and Later Model Year Automobiles 
—Labeling, 40 C.F.R. § 600.307-95 (1994). 
 40. Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1385 
(1990). 
 41. Okubo, supra note 4, at 601 (explaining that where consumers’ envi-
ronmental awareness is well developed, labeling programs should create de-
mand pressures in favor of environmentally friendly products).  See also 
FIELD Briefing Paper, supra note 12, at 8 (stating that “the potential for 
growth in the market share of eco-labeled products makes eco-labeling a com-
pelling marketing tool”). 
 42. Okubo, supra note 4, at 605. 
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nancing of the program43 without creating the “adversarial pos-
ture of the mandatory requirements” because peer and public 
pressure are the only factors for the producer to consider.44  One 
example of this type of program is the German Blue Angel pro-
gram, which is credited as being the world’s first environmental 
labeling program.45   
Launched in 1977 to promote more environmentally-sound 
products, Blue Angel is administered by the German govern-
ment through three bodies: the Federal Environmental Agency 
(FEA), the Environmental Label Jury (ELJ), and the Institute 
for Quality Assurance and Labeling (RAL).46   
The FEA performs a streamlined LCA47 in order to determine 
which stages of the product’s life cycle results in the most sig-
nificant environmental impacts.  The FEA next drafts criteria 
regarding these significant impacts, which are to be met by re-
cipients of the ‘Blue Angel’ award.  It forwards these criteria to 
the [RAL] for review.  RAL ... then convenes a panel of ex-
perts, drawn from manufacturing, environmental, consumer, 
and union groups to critique the draft criteria.  It then for-
wards this critique to the ELJ, which possesses the final au-
thority on whether to approve the new set of ecolabeling crite-
ria.  In the past, the ELJ has approved between three to six 
new eco-label categories each year.  This entire process of 
establishing a new eco-label can last from between six months 
to two years.48 
Another example of a voluntary government sponsored pro-
gram is a so-called “seal of approval.”  In such a program, the 
government, or an institution closely connected to the govern-
ment, gives compliant products a government “seal of approval” 
  
 43. FIELD Briefing Paper, supra note 12, at 6 (explaining that government 
involvement would help to “ensure consistency of criteria, balance of views of 
different parties, greater accountability to the public and greater transpar-
ency”).    
 44. Okubo, supra note 4, at 605. 
 45. FIELD Briefing Paper, supra note 12, at 6 n.16.   
 46. Id.   
 47. For a definition of LCA, see supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 48. Staffin, supra note 3, at 225 (internal citations omitted).  For a more 
detailed discussion of the German Blue Angel program, see OECD, ECO-
LABELLING: ACTUAL EFFECTS OF SELECTED PROGRAMMES 25–27 (1997), available 
at http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/1997doc.nsf/linkto/ocde-gd(97)105 (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2005). 
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or other similar positive label.49  Both the German Blue Angel 
program and other similar seals of approval garner more credi-
bility than voluntary privately-sponsored programs discussed 
below.50 
3. Voluntary Private-Sponsored Labeling Programs 
The voluntary private-sponsored labeling program is a newly-
developing area.51  This type of program is significant because it 
does not require the support of individual governments, and 
thus, should not conflict with GATT/WTO rules.  This is so be-
cause GATT/WTO rules are normally understood to cover only 
state activities.52  These programs do not involve government 
oversight or participation, as they are either administered by a 
third party or based on self assessment, i.e. a declaration by the 
manufacturers themselves.53 
One example of such a program is Green Seal in the United 
States.54  Green Seal is an independent non-profit organization 
that identifies and endorses products and services that cause 
less toxic pollution and waste, conserve resources and habitats, 
and minimize global warming and ozone depletion.55  On the 
basis of proposals made by industry and the public, Green Seal 
selects product categories for its program based on a number of 
factors including: significance of environmental impact, the op-
portunity for its reduction, public interest, manufacturer inter-
est and promotional opportunity.56  
  
 49. Okubo, supra note 4, at 605.  
 50. Id. at 605–07 (discussing the advantages of government involvement). 
 51. Id. at 607. 
 52. Id. at 609.  The author goes on to note that some arguments remain as 
to state responsibility for the activities of private groups.  Id. 
 53. FIELD Briefing Paper, supra note 12, at 6–7 (explaining that typically 
voluntary privately-sponsored labeling programs receive no government spon-
sorship, funding or assistance and are typically made without third party 
certification or investigation).   
 54. See Green Seal Website, About Green Seal, at http://www.greenseal. 
org/about.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2004). 
 55. Id.   
 56. See OECD, supra note 48, at 28.  Green Seal’s specific programs in-
clude: (1) Greening Your Government (technical assistance to all levels of gov-
ernment in their purchasing, operations, and facilities management); (2) 
Product Standards and Certification (development of environmental stan-
dards for leadership products in specific categories and certification of prod-
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One attribute that all three types of labeling programs share 
is their common advantages and disadvantages.  However, the 
level of compliance and regulation associated with each type of 
program may help to alleviate some of the disadvantages pre-
sent in all labeling programs.   
C.  Advantages of Labeling Programs 
The following is a list of the possible advantages of a labeling 
program.  The advantages can be broken down into the follow-
ing sections: (a) advantages to the consumer; (b) advantages to 
business and manufacturing; and (c) advantages to the envi-
ronment or human health. 
1. Advantages to the Consumer 
Perhaps the most obvious advantage to the consumer is 
heightened consumer awareness.57  For example, consider labels 
on alcoholic beverages that warn a pregnant consumer that 
consumption of the product could adversely affect the preg-
nancy.  Likewise, environmental labels provide an environmen-
tally-conscious consumer with the necessary information to 
make an informed decision.  Labels may be a powerful tool to 
express the health or environmental component of a product, so 
much so that certain producers may fear the requirement of a 
label.58  However, many critics argue that it may be difficult for 
the consumer to determine whether statements on a product 
  
ucts that meet them); (3) Product Recommendations (technical reports called 
Choose Green Reports on products in a variety of categories giving specific 
brand recommendations of those that meet screening criteria); (4) Greening 
the Lodging Industry (long-term project with hotels and motels to green their 
operations and purchasing and includes certification of specific properties); 
and (5) Policy (leadership in green procurement policy, international policy for 
environmental labeling, etc.).  See About Green Seal, supra note 54. 
 57. See Staffin, supra note 3, at 215.  
 58. For example, company documents produced during toxic tort litigation 
involving the W.R. Grace insulating product Monokote revealed that the com-
pany knew in 1977 that the product contained low levels of a rare form of 
asbestos called tremolite.  Grace chose not to label the product or otherwise 
inform customers out of fear that labeling would severely dampen sales of the 
product.  Thomas O. McGarity, Proposal for Linking Culpability and Causa-
tion to Ensure Corporate Accountability for Toxic Risks, 26 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 36 (2001).   
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are truthful.59  It is possible that a consumer may mistake a la-
bel on a product as an advertising ploy or attention grabber.  
This concern emphasizes the need for a supervised governmen-
tal program, independent third-party oversight, or expert as-
sessment techniques that are able to provide the consumer with 
the necessary verification.60  
2. Advantages to Business and Manufacturing 
Labeling may create greater efficiency for manufacturers.61   
Companies that are forced to meet the requirements of a label 
either through government regulation or market pressures will 
feel pressure to comply with the standards to compete in the 
marketplace.  Such companies will be forced to invest in cleaner 
or safer technologies which may, in turn, increase production, 
efficiency, and profitability.  In addition, companies that earn 
the reputation of being more “green” or healthy than others will 
likely enjoy greater sales, customer loyalty, and consideration.62   
3. Advantages to the Environment 
Unsurprisingly, the environmental advantage is perhaps the 
main goal of an environmental program; the same is true for a 
labeling program that seeks to reduce potential negative effects 
on human health.63  Labeling provides the opportunity to differ-
  
 59. See George Richards, Note, Environmental Labeling of Consumer 
Products: The Need for International Harmonization of Standards Governing 
Third-Party Certification Programs, 7 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 235, 247 
(1994) (arguing that, “consumers are unable to determine the truthfulness of 
whether a product is, for example ‘ozone friendly.’  Verification of such a claim 
is beyond the capacity of the typical consumer.”).   
 60. See id. (noting that the result of an “objective verification is a reduction 
of the information gathering cost to the consumer, which translates into 
greater use and acceptance of the program by consumers and a greater de-
mand for the products”).   
 61. Id. at 247–48. 
 62. See Okubo, supra note 4, at 601, 602–03 (explaining that many produc-
ers use labels to gain a competitive advantage through their green image, 
especially where environmental awareness is high).  See also Richards, supra 
note 59, at 238 n.16, 17 (citing surveys that place the percentage of “green” 
consumers as 82% to 90% of the total population and noting the significant 
impact of “green labeling” on the production and advertising of products). 
 63. For a discussion of the purposes and goals of a labeling program see 
supra notes 25–29 and accompanying text.  
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entiate products that are produced in a healthier or more envi-
ronmentally-sound way from those that are not,64 perhaps with-
out even violating the rules of the WTO.65  A labeling program 
may avoid violating WTO rules because labeling programs are 
often regarded as a less restrictive trade measure than tradi-
tional legislative and administrative policy instruments and 
“[g]overnments tend to support these schemes because labeling 
provides incentives for producers to lessen the environmental 
[or health] impact of their products without establishing bind-
ing restrictions or direct bans on products.”66  For example, suc-
cessful environmental labeling protects the environment in two 
ways.  First, it assures that the labeled products are more envi-
ronmentally-friendly than could be expected without the label, 
and second, it gives environmentally-concerned consumers the 
ability to avoid products with negative environmental impacts.67  
Some argue that labeling programs aim to help improve the 
environment “in each country by reducing the pollution that 
unconcerned, non-compliant companies might otherwise 
cause.”68  
A labeling program’s success hinges on its ability to use its 
greatest characteristic: its ability to attack the use of damaging 
products from the demand side of the market.  Shifts in demand 
will create a competitive incentive to suppliers and manufac-
turers to raise the level of environmental quality of their prod-
ucts.69  Hopefully, such shifts will lead directly to less environ-
mental damage or decreased medical costs. By addressing the 
  
 64. Anna Henriksen, Voluntary Environmental Labelling and the World 
Trade Organisation, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 
WITH CHRISTIAN FRISS BACH 3 (Nov. 9, 1998), available at 
http://www.econ.ku.dk/cfb/trade/papers/henriksen.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 
2005). 
 65. Id. at 5.  A country with high environmental demands may legislate for 
its domestic industry, ensuring that domestic products are produced in an 
environmentally sound way.  However, the domestic products face competition 
with imported products that may have been produced in a more polluting 
manner.  In the WTO, the country is not allowed to differentiate between the 
foreign and domestic products when the characteristics of the products are the 
same.  Id.   
 66. Okubo, supra note 4, at 602.   
 67. Henriksen, supra note 64, at 2.     
 68. Nuyda, supra note 16.   
 69. Richards, supra note 59, at 248. 
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demand side, labeling cannot be overruled by suppliers, largely 
because labeling programs use market mechanisms.70 Market 
mechanisms and demand shifts are especially important be-
cause “protection measures addressing the supply side are often 
overruled by lobbying.”71   
D.  Labeling Disadvantages 
A labeling program has potential disadvantages if not admin-
istered properly.  These disadvantages include: (a) its potential 
for abuse as a restrictive trade measure, which serves as a 
source of continuing debate between developed and developing 
nations; (b) a label’s potential inconsistency and inaccuracy; and 
(c) fear among producers that labeling programs may be too 
costly to implement. 
1. The Debate between Developing Countries’ and Developed 
Countries’ Labeling Programs and their Potential for Abuse 
When Used as Restricted Trade Measures 
The debate between the principal of uninhibited free trade 
and a nation’s right to protect the health of its citizenry and 
environment has revealed sharp distinctions between the posi-
tions of developed and developing countries.72  Developed coun-
tries enjoy a higher per capita standard of living than develop-
ing countries.73  Due to a greater amount of disposable income, 
citizens in developed countries can choose between different 
products.  Recognizing this ability, “developed countries have 
been prone to utilize (or at least threaten to utilize) trade 
measures, such as import bans, in order to cause producers in 
developing countries to change their environmentally harmful 
PPMs74 to more benign methods.”75  However, developing coun-
  
 70. Henriksen, supra note 64, at 6.  See also Staffin, supra note 3, at 210 
(stating that “eco-labeling schemes attempt to marshall the forces of consumer 
demand in order to effect environmentally beneficial changes on the supply 
side”).     
 71. Henriksen, supra note 64, at 5.     
 72. See Scott Vaughan, Trade and Environment: Some North-South Con-
siderations, 27 CORNELL INT’L L.J 591 (1994).   
 73. See Staffin, supra note 3, at 207 (noting that while their standard of 
living is high, developed nations have recently become conscious of the devas-
tating environmental harm caused by unfettered economic growth). 
 74. For a definition of PPMs, see supra note 25 and accompanying text.   
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tries see this use of trade measures “as a unilateral attempt to 
export the [developed country’s] domestic environmental laws, 
which may be appropriate for the [developed country’s] … level 
of industrial development, but which are too restrictive for … 
[the developing] countries.”76   Developing countries view these 
trade restrictions as an unfair attempt to punish them for envi-
ronmental damage that was arguably caused by the developed 
countries themselves.77  Additionally, developing countries ar-
gue that such restrictions are “protectionist, discriminatory, 
and in violation of their sovereign rights to develop and exploit 
their own resources.”78   
These arguments have some import.  Labeling requirements 
set forth by a protectionist country can be abused as a non-tariff 
trade barrier in numerous ways.79  For example, criteria can be 
designed to favor the domestic production, application proce-
dures for compliance with the label program can be made ex-
ceedingly difficult for foreign producers, or the choice of product 
category can be heavily influenced by local industries’ needs.80  
However, developing countries are equally concerned with en-
suring that labels will not become yet another restrictive busi-
ness practice which further limits market access for their prod-
ucts.  After all, many national economies of developing coun-
tries depend greatly upon the export earnings with which to pay 
for food imports and social services.81    
2. The Potential Inconsistency and Inaccuracy of Labels 
Labels can send a dubious message.  Some labels currently in 
use may not clearly communicate the harm the product or proc-
ess is seeking to avoid or the protection the product offers.  
Consider, for example, labels that encourage consumers to buy 
locally.82  One could walk the aisles of a local grocery store’s 
  
 75. Staffin, supra note 3, at 208. 
 76. Id.   
 77. See DANIEL C. ESTY, INST. FOR INT’L ECON., GREENING THE GATT: 
TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE 182 (1994).  
 78. Staffin, supra note 3, at 208. 
 79. Henriksen, supra note 64, at 7.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Barham, supra note 25.  
 82. See id.  For example, such labels may be used by local farmers to at-
tract sales. 
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produce department and see these labels affixed to a variety of 
goods, including farm produce.  One argument is that such pur-
chases might reduce the environmental costs of excess pollution 
that accompany the additional transportation of the produce 
shipped from greater distances.  However, these labels may 
have other connotations than simply escaping the pollution as-
sociated with transportation.83   They can be used to support 
local business and, therefore, stymie other domestic or foreign 
goods.  Without government checks and qualification assess-
ments on these labeling techniques, the messages sent by pro-
ducers are, at least, dubious and, at worst, worthless.  Of 
course, the level of regulation of the truth and accuracy of the 
label may depend on who, in fact, sponsors the labeling pro-
gram.  If it is a government-sponsored labeling program,84 then 
it stands to reason that the government would regulate the 
truth and accuracy of the label.  If it is a voluntary privately-
sponsored program,85 then the industry, trade group, or non-
governmental organization (NGO) sponsor of the program 
would regulate the label’s truth and accuracy.   
It has been argued that some labels are ineffective because 
they are susceptible to abuse by manufacturers who may de-
ceive customers into thinking that a product is safer than it is.86  
Additionally, environmentally-friendly production is rarely the 
cheapest method and it often requires a higher price.87  More-
over, an additional argument which supports the conclusion 
that labels are ineffective is that “labelling is not an effective 
instrument in guiding the consumers to choose between prod-
ucts that belong to different categories, but serve the same pur-
pose,” i.e., “rechargeable batteries in comparison with non-
rechargeable.”88  Therefore, in such a situation, it may be diffi-
cult for a producer to significantly increase its market share.    
  
 83. See id. The reasons supported for buying locally often reference non-
market, non-commodifiable values of a social or ethical basis as well as eco-
logical.  Id.   
 84. See discussion supra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2. 
 85. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.  
 86. Henriksen, supra note 64, at 2 (discussing single issue labels).  
 87. Id at 3.  The reward for this process is that the label may give the 
product a marketing advantage, which hopefully offsets the higher price.  Id. 
 88. Id. 
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3. Fear Among Producers Could Inhibit a Labeling Regime from 
Coming to Fruition 
Labels provoke fears among producers.89  This fear stems par-
tially from the producer’s concern that it may be unable to com-
ply economically with a mandatory labeling scheme which will 
result in a loss of market share.90   Needless to say, a change of 
procedure or production method requires a tremendous amount 
of capital expenditures.  In addition, this fear and concern could 
create tension between NGOs and producers.91  If the birth of an 
international label regime is in the near future, this tension 
may result in the granting of too many concessions by label 
supporters to the arguably more powerful producers, which 
may, in turn, give rise to the hasty adoption of an ineffective 
regime.  
This situation is compounded by the unbalanced level of bar-
gaining power between the collectively strong producers and the 
relatively weak label supporters.  A successful labeling program 
would require tremendous support from the producers them-
selves.92  The producers must have faith that the investments 
required to meet the labeling requirements will pay off in the 
market.  However, risk-averse producers will fear the signifi-
cant up-front costs and worry that the label will not have its 
intended effect.  In addition, a producer’s decision to join a la-
beling program may quell other possible innovation which nec-
essarily will be foregone to satisfy the labeling program’s re-
quirements.  Research and development for other solutions may 
cease so that the company can focus all attention on being a 
leader in its label program.  In addition, in the case of environ-
mental labeling, the “label requires good marketing when intro-
duced in order to gain credibility.  The label has no effect if the 
consumers do not consider it a guarantee for an environmen-
tally-friendly product.”93  
In order to fully understand how these programs will interact 
with the GATT rules, specifically Article XX, it is first necessary 
  
 89. Freire de Oliveira Souza, supra note 8, at 164. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. at 164–65. 
 92. See Richards, supra note 59, at 250 (discussing the lack of industry 
support).  
 93. Henriksen, supra note 64, at 6.   
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to set forth the GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanism and 
the major provisions of the GATT.  This discussion is necessary 
because Article XX is used as a defense to the following rules 
and the validity of the Article XX defense is usually determined 
within the GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanism.   
III. GATT/WTO LAW AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
A.  The Dispute Settlement Mechanism Under the World Trade 
Organization 
One of the problems with the status quo of reconciling free 
trade with environmental or human health measures that may 
restrict free trade is that the WTO has the only worldwide 
mandatory and binding dispute settlement mechanism.  There-
fore, because they often incite trade measures, unresolved envi-
ronmental conflicts have great potential for facing a WTO 
panel.94  This problem lies in the fact that environmental con-
flicts are often resolved by trade experts on WTO panels who 
may not be sufficiently educated in environmental or human 
health related issues to resolve disputes concerning them.95  Be-
cause, for better or worse, such disputes will often end up before 
the dispute resolution machinery of the WTO, it is imperative 
that this Article set out the dispute settlement procedures un-
der the WTO.    
Before the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations,96 the dis-
pute settlement mechanism of the GATT was not binding.  It 
was not until the establishment of the WTO and the creation of 
the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) that decisions 
were binding.97  The DSU is administered by the Dispute Set-
  
 94. Laura Yavitz, The WTO and the Environment: The Shrimp Case that 
Created a New World Order, 16 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 203, 203 
(2001–2002). 
 95. See Shane Spelliscy, The Proliferation of International Tribunals: A 
Chink in the Armor, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 143, 155 (2001), citing M.C.W. 
Pinto, The Court and Other International Tribunals, in INCREASING THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
ICJ/UNITAR COLLOQUIUM TO CELEBRATE THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE COURT 
280, 295 (Connie Peck & Roy S. Lee eds., 1997).   
 96. The Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations resulted in the establish-
ment of the World Trade Organization.  See WTO Agreement, supra note 2.  
 97. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
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tlement Body.98  First, the parties to the dispute are encouraged 
to solve the dispute between themselves.99  If a solution cannot 
be reached between the parties, the complaining party may re-
quest that a panel be established to complete a report.100  The 
panel will apply the regime rules to the dispute and set forth an 
appropriate decision.101  If requested, the Appellate Body will 
review legal appeals from the panel’s decision.102  The panel con-
sists of well-qualified governmental and/or non-governmental 
individuals, including persons who have served on or presented 
a case to a panel, or have served as a representative of a Mem-
ber or of a contracting party to the GATT, or have served as a 
representative to the Council of Committee of any covered 
agreement or its predecessor agreement, or in the Secretariat, 
or have taught or published on international trade law or pol-
icy, or have served as a senior trade policy official of a Mem-
ber.103  During the interim review stage, the panel shall issue a 
report to both parties.104 Upon completion of this report three 
things may happen: (1) the parties can appeal the report, in 
which case the DSB would await the decision of the Appellate 
Body;105 (2) the report is adopted at a DSB meeting;106 or (3) the 
DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report.107   
The losing party to the trade dispute is provided three options 
under the DSU: (1) it can bring the measure found to be incon-
sistent with the Agreement into compliance or otherwise comply 
  
Organization, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS – RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY 
ROUND, vol. 27, art. 17.14, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU] (providing 
that an Appellate Body report must be “unconditionally accepted by the par-
ties to the dispute”).   
 98. See id. art. 2. 
 99. Id. art. 4. 
 100. Id. art. 6.   
 101. Id. arts. 6, 11 
 102. Id.   
 103. Id. art. 8 
 104. Id. art. 15.  
 105. Id. art. 17. 
 106. Id. art. 16.4.  
 107. Id.  However, this result is unlikely to happen because of the danger 
that it poses to the legitimacy of the dispute settlement system.  See Antonio 
Perez, WTO and U.N. Law: Institutional Comity in National Security, 23 YALE 
J. INT’L L. 301, 341 n.168 (1998).  See also Bal Gopal Das, Intellectual Property 
Dispute, GATT, WIPO: Of Playing by the Game Rules and Rules of the Game, 
35 IDEA 149, 169 n.128 (1994).  
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with the recommendations and ruling within the reasonable 
period of time determined; (2) it may enter into negotiations 
with any party having invoked the dispute settlement proce-
dures, with a view to developing mutually acceptable compensa-
tion; or (3) if no satisfactory agreement on compensation is 
reached within a reasonable time period, any party having in-
voked the dispute settlement procedures may request authori-
zation from the DSB to suspend any concessions entered under 
the covered agreements.108  However, the DSU promotes 
“prompt compliance” to ensure effective resolution of disputes to 
the benefit of all members.109 
B.  GATT/WTO Provisions and Laws 
This Article discusses the Article XX exception to the 
GATT/WTO rules and its application to labeling programs.  
However, to fully understand Article XX’s application with re-
spect to labeling programs, it is first necessary to understand 
how it interacts with other GATT/WTO rules.  Article XX is in-
voked by a WTO Member as a defense to that Member’s chal-
lenged trade restriction.110  Therefore, it is essential to provide a 
background explaining the challenges which may be brought by 
an “attacking” Member who is claiming that a trade restriction 
is being imposed on them by the “defensive” Member who has 
imposed the trade restriction.  Defensive Members will invoke 
the Article XX exception.  It is also important to note that the 
provision which Article XX is intended to shelter may perhaps 
be a violation of one of the following provisions and rules.  How-
ever, as long as the trade restriction is acceptable under Article 
XX, meaning the least restrictive trade measure necessary to 
satisfy the protected policy covered under Article XX, it will be 
permitted under GATT/WTO rules.111 
  
 108. See DSU, supra note 97, art. 22.2. 
 109. See id. art. 21.1.  See also Claire R. Kelly, The Value Vacuum: Self En-
forcing Regimes and the Dilution of the Normative Feedback Loop, 22 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 673, 705 (2001) (arguing that the “DSU explicitly states that compli-
ance is preferred”).          
 110. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND TEXT ON THE NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 533 (4th 
ed. 2002) (explaining the proper analysis of an Article XX “defense”).   
 111. See infra Part IV discussing Article XX.    
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1. Article I:  General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment 
Article I, often considered the cornerstone of the GATT,112 
provides that:  
[With] respect to customs and duties and charges of any kind 
imposed on, or in connection with, importation or exportation 
or imposed on the international transfer of payments for im-
ports or exports ... any advantage, favour, privilege or immu-
nity granted by any contracting party to any product originat-
ing in or destined for any other country shall be accorded im-
mediately and unconditionally to the like product originating 
in or destined for the territories of all other Contracting Par-
ties.113   
Essentially, Article I requires “that in the administration of 
their tariffs and other regulations relating to trade in goods, 
WTO members [must] not discriminate between their trading 
partners; [and must] accord each other most-favored-nation 
(MFN) status.”114  Thus, for example, all members must pay the 
same custom duties or be subject to the same regulations as the 
MFN.115   
2. Article III: National Treatment on Internal Taxation and 
Regulation 
Custom duties or “tariffs” are covered by Article I and thus, 
are not covered by Article III.  However, other types of taxes are 
covered by Article III.116  Article III sets forth the principle of 
“National Treatment,” which provides that a country may not 
discriminate against imported products via use of an internal 
tax or other internal measure.117  Thus, Article III prohibits in-
ternal taxes, as well as internal charges, laws and regulations, 
and other requirements that may affect the sale of the product 
in the country.  Article III:2 provides, in relevant part, that  
“the products of the territory of any contracting party imported 
  
 112. See, e.g., ALAN C. SWAN & JOHN F. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 481 
(2d ed. 1999).   
 113. WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. I.   
 114. SWAN & MURPHY, supra note 112, at 481. 
 115. Yavitz, supra note 94, at 209.   
 116. Id.   
 117. Id. 
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into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be 
subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal 
charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indi-
rectly, to like domestic products.”118  While Article III:4 concerns 
differential treatment of all laws, regulations, and require-
ments, and provides, in relevant part, “the products of the terri-
tory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any 
other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less fa-
vourable than that accorded to like products of national origin 
in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting 
their internal sale… .”119 
One example of a WTO panel report and subsequent Appel-
late Body decision that addressed Article III is the Gasoline 
Case.120  In the Gasoline Case, the United States imposed a 
measure which prohibited the sale of conventional gasoline in 
metropolitan areas and only permitted the sale of reformulated 
gasoline in an effort to reduce the pollution caused by conven-
tional gasoline.121  The U.S. law provided that certain domestic 
refiners had to create individual quality baselines (representing 
the quality of gasoline produced by them in 1990) and subse-
quent domestic production need only satisfy such baselines, 
whereas foreign manufacturers were required to satisfy the 
statutory baselines provided in the law.122  The panel report con-
cluded that the rule violated Article III:4 because imported 
gasoline was required to meet the statutory baseline, while do-
mestic gasoline need only meet the applicable individual base-
line.123  Clearly, the United States was in violation of Article III 
because it did not treat like products alike.   
3. Article XI: General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions 
Article XI may be the GATT rule with which most people are 
familiar.  Essentially, Article XI prohibits any kind of quantita-
  
 118. WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. III:2.   
 119. Id. art. III:4.   
 120. WTO Appellate Body Report on Gasoline: United States – Standards 
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, AB-1996-1, WT/DS2/AB/R, 35 
I.L.M. 603 (1996) (adopted May 20, 1996) [hereinafter Gasoline Case].    
 121. Id. para. I.B.  
 122. Id. para. I.B.3.iii.   
 123. Id. para. I.C.  The United States did not appeal this finding at the 
Appellate Body level.  
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tive restriction on imports.124  Article XI provides in relevant 
part: 
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or 
other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import 
or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or 
maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any 
product of the territory of any other contracting party or on 
the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for 
the territory of any other contracting party.125   
The most typical quantitative restriction on imports is the use 
of a quota or an outright ban either through direct or indirect 
action.  An example of an indirect ban or quota would be the 
requirement of a license to import goods.  
There have been many panels through the GATT/WTO’s rela-
tively short history which have addressed Article XI claims.  
The most notable include the Beef Hormone dispute,126 and the 
Tuna I,127 Tuna II,128 and Shrimp Turtle disputes.129  In the Beef 
Hormones dispute, the EC attempted to prohibit imports of beef 
containing hormones from Canada and the United States.130  In 
the Tuna I and II disputes, the United States attempted to ban 
the importation of tuna which was fished using methods that 
  
 124. See WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. XI. 
 125. Id. art. XI:1.   
 126. WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures 
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, 
WT/DS/48/AB/R, (Jan. 16, 1998), 1998 WL 25520 at 1 [hereinafter Beef Hor-
mones Case]. 
 127. GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States – Restric-
tions on Imports of Tuna, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993), reprinted 
in 30 I.L.M. 1594 (Aug. 16, 1991) (unadopted) [hereinafter Tuna I].     
 128. GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report, United States – Restrictions 
on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. DS29/R, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 839 (June 16, 
1994) [hereinafter Tuna II] (unadopted). 
 129. WTO Dispute Panel Report on United States – Import Prohibitions of 
Certain Shrimps and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R/Corr.1 (May 15, 1998), 
reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 832 (1998) [hereinafter Shrimp Turtle Panel Report]; 
WTO Appellate Body Report on United States – Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), reprinted in 38 
I.L.M. 118 (1999) [hereinafter Shrimp Turtle AB Report] (adopted on Nov. 6, 
1998).   
 130. Beef Hormones Case, supra note 126. 
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were not considered “dolphin-safe.”131  In the Shrimp Turtle dis-
pute, the United States attempted to ban the importation of 
shrimp that were harvested using methods which were not sea-
turtle friendly.132  In each of these disputes, the trade restric-
tions were considered violations of Article XI.133   
The rules discussed above provide an illustration of the legal 
rules a trading Member may use to challenge a trade measure 
or restriction of another trading Member.  However, there is an 
important exception to these rules provided for in Article XX.  
Generally, Article XX provides that a Member may institute a 
trade restriction if that restriction is necessary to protect hu-
man, animal or plant life, or, inter alia, is related to the conser-
vation of exhaustible natural resources.134  Part IV, infra, dis-
cusses in greater depth the application of the Article XX excep-
tion.   
IV. ARTICLE XX GENERAL EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE 
A.  Description of the General Exceptions Clause 
The Article XX General Exceptions Clause is of particular 
importance to the WTO’s most contentious issue in recent 
years—the relationship or, more precisely, conflict between 
trade and environmental protection.135  This trade-environment 
conflict first came to a head in the Tuna I and Tuna II dis-
putes.136  Even though the results of Tuna I and Tuna II were 
never adopted by the GATT Council,137 the cases received wide-
  
 131. Tuna I, supra note 127, paras. 2.7–2.8; Tuna II, supra note 128, para. 
1.1.  See also, infra notes 276–283 and accompanying text discussing the Dol-
phin Protection Consumer Information Act.   
 132. Shrimp Turtle Panel Report, supra note 129, para. 2.6. 
 133. See, e.g., Tuna I, supra note 127, para. 7.1(a) (“The import prohibitions 
imposed by the United States with respect to certain yellowfin tuna and cer-
tain yellowfin tuna products of ‘intermediary nations’ … are contrary to Arti-
cle XI:1.”); Shrimp Turtle AB Report, supra note 129, para. 7.16 (“[T]he 
United States [sic] prohibition on imports of shrimp from non-certified Mem-
bers violates Article XI:1.”). 
 134. WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. XX(b), (g). 
 135. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 110, at 532.  
 136. See generally Tuna I, supra note 127; Tuna II, supra note 128.     
 137. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 110, at 532. 
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spread attention and caused many to view the GATT in a very 
unfavorable light.138  
As discussed above, Article XX is a defense to a trade restric-
tion139 that is invoked by the trading member who imposed a 
measure that another trading member argues is a restriction on 
trade in violation of the GATT Agreement.  The practice of the 
DSU panels “has been to interpret Article XX narrowly, to place 
the burden on the party invoking Article XX to justify its invo-
cation, and not to examine Article XX exceptions unless in-
voked.”140  A discussion of the structure of Article XX is neces-
sary for understanding its analysis in DSU panels.  This Article 
will focus solely on three of the exceptions articulated in Article 
XX: XX(b)’s protection of health exception,141 Article XX(d)’s en-
forcement exception,142 and Article XX(g)’s conservation excep-
tion.143  The reason for this focus is because these three excep-
tions, compared to the other exceptions of Article XX, “have 
been the subject of an extraordinarily detailed Appellate Body 
jurisdiction developed during the first seven years of WTO’s 
existence.”144   
Article XX consists of three main parts, which the next sec-
tion of the Article addresses in turn.  First is the list of meas-
ures a contracting party may impose that fall within Article 
XX’s scope.145  This part is often referred to as the “policy test.”146  
  
 138. See, e.g., Jessica Mathews, Dolphins, Tuna and Free Trade; “No Coun-
try Can Protect Its Own Smidgen of Air or Ocean”, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1991, 
at A21 (arguing that the analysis and reasoning of the panel would invalidate 
laws designed to protect endangered species in the United States).   
 139. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 110, at 533 (explaining the proper 
analysis of an Article XX defense).   
 140. Tuna I, supra note 127, para. 5.22. 
 141. For the language of article XX(b), see infra note 145. 
 142. For the language of article XX(d), see infra note 145. 
 143. For the language of article XX(g), see infra note 145. 
 144. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 110, at 532. 
 145. WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. XX.  The list of measures which fall 
within Article XX’s scope includes those which are: 
(a) necessary to protect public morals; 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
(c) relating to the importation or exportation of gold or silver; 
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are 
not inconsistent with GATT rules themselves; 
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Second is what is called the “nexus requirement.”147  Third is 
Article XX’s introduction, which is often referred to as the “cha-
peau.”148 
B.  Analysis of Article XX 
1. The Policy Test 
The Appellate Body has declared that a proper analysis of an 
Article XX defense must begin with a determination of whether 
the trade measure at issue is covered under one of Article XX’s 
enumerated measures.149  For example, under Article XX(b), the 
panel would inquire whether the trade measure or provision is 
  
(e) relating to the products of prison labor; 
(f) imposed for the protection of national treasures;  
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources; 
(h) undertaken pursuant to obligations of certain international com-
modity agreements; 
(i) involving restrictions on exports necessary to ensure domestic 
supplies when the domestic price is held below the world price by the 
government for price stabilization reasons; and 
(j) essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in short 
supply.                                           
Id.  See also JACKSON ET AL., supra note 110, at 532–33.   
 146. See, e.g., Yavitz, supra note 94, at 215.   
 147. Although typically referred to as the necessary requirement, this defi-
nition is a misnomer.  Although Art. XX(b) and (d) require that the measure 
be necessary for the goal sought, Art. XX(g) does not require the restrictive 
measure to be necessary to the objective of protecting the exhaustible natural 
resource; instead, it only requires that it “relate” to the objective.  WTO 
Agreement, supra note 2, art. XX(b),(d), (g).  However, this difference may not 
have a significant impact, “presumably because any measure that limits de-
pletion of a natural resource is justified per se” and, arguably, would meet a 
necessary requirement in any event.  Philip Bentley Q.C., A Re-Assessment of 
Article XX, Paragraphs (B) and (G) of GATT 1994 in the Light of Growing 
Consumer and Environmental Concern About Biotechnology, 24 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 107, 112 (2000). Therefore, to avoid any confusion, this Article will 
use the term “nexus requirement” to avoid any further confusion in developing 
this term.     
 148. For the language of the chapeau, see infra note 219 and accompanying 
text. 
 149. See, e.g., Shrimp Turtle AB Report, supra note 129.  See also JACKSON 
ET AL., supra note 110, at 533.   
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necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.  
Analysis of this requirement is fairly straightforward and the 
easiest of the three requirements to apply and satisfy.150  To il-
lustrate this point, many of the challenged measures brought 
under the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures that 
were found inconsistent with GATT/WTO rules, in fact, satis-
fied this first requirement under Article XX.  Examples of such 
disputes include: the Thai Cigarettes dispute,151 where the panel 
concluded that a measure to reduce cigarette use was within 
the policy area, but later found the measures Thailand imposed 
inconsistent with the GATT rules on other grounds;152 Tuna II, 
where the panel determined that the protection of dolphin life 
was in the policy area, however, later found that the measures 
imposed by the United States were inconsistent with the GATT 
rules on other grounds;153 and, with the same result for the 
United States as that in Tuna II, the Shrimp Turtle dispute, 
where the panel found that the protection of turtles as an en-
dangered species was within the policy area.154    
2. The Nexus Requirement 
In order for a WTO Member to successfully raise a defense 
under Article XX (b) and (d), the measure must be strictly nec-
essary for the objective pursued with respect to the defenses 
raised.155  For defenses raised under Article XX(g), the measure 
must be “related to” the conservation of an exhaustible natural 
resource.156  In other words, the nexus test prohibits a Member 
  
 150. See Yavitz, supra note 94, at 215.   
 151. GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on Thai Restrictions on 
Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. 
(37th Supp.) at 200 (1990), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1122 (1991) [hereinafter Thai 
Cigarettes].   
 152. For a full discussion of the Thai Cigarettes dispute, see notes 159–179 
and accompanying text. 
 153. See Tuna II, supra note 128, at 890–98.    
 154. Shrimp Turtle AB Report, supra note 129, para. 160 (explaining that 
the panel agreed that the US measure falls within the terms of Article XX(g), 
but the issue was whether the US measure constituted “a means of arbitrary 
or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions 
prevail” or “a disguised restriction on international trade” under the chapeau).   
 155. See, e.g., WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. XX(b) (requiring that the 
measure be necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health). 
 156. See id. art. XX(g).   
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from adopting a measure that is inconsistent with any other 
GATT/WTO provision if an alternative, which is not inconsis-
tent with other GATT/WTO provisions, can reasonably be em-
ployed by such Member.157  However, this nexus test is not 
whether the policy underlying the measure is necessary but, 
rather, whether the measure is necessary to achieve the stated 
policy objective.158  
3. Application of the Nexus Requirement 
a. Thai Cigarettes Dispute 
The best way to illustrate the nexus requirement is through 
analysis of the Thai Cigarettes dispute.  The Thai Cigarettes 
dispute involved a challenge brought by the United States with 
regards to the Thai government’s restrictions on imports of, and 
disproportionate taxes on, foreign-made cigarettes.159  The panel 
found that Thailand’s restrictions on imports were in violation 
of Article XI:1 because the government had not granted licenses 
for the importation of cigarettes in ten years.160  However, the 
panel found that the regulations relating to the excise, busi-
ness, and municipal taxes on cigarettes were consistent with 
Thailand’s obligations under Article III of the GATT.161  The 
  
 157. Thai Cigarettes, supra note 151, para. 74.   
 158. Yavitz, supra note 94, at 215.   
 159. See Thai Cigarettes, supra note 151, para. 1.  Under section 27 of the 
Tobacco Act, 1966, the importation of various types of tobacco was prohibited 
except by license granted by the Director-General of the Excise Department or 
a competent officer authorized by him.  But licenses have only been granted to 
the Thai Tobacco Monopoly, and the monopoly has only imported cigarettes on 
three occasions in the previous 25 years.  Id. para. 6.      
 160. Id. para. 67.  Article XI:1 provides in relevant part that “[n]o prohibi-
tions or restrictions ... made effective through...import licenses...shall be insti-
tuted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any prod-
uct of the territory of any other contracting party....” WTO Agreement, supra 
note 2, art. XI:1.   
 161. Thai Cigarettes, supra note 151, para. 88.  This conclusion was reached 
because there was no showing on the part of the United States that the taxes 
were applied contrary to Article III, only that they could have been applied 
inconsistent with Article III, and the possibility that the Thai Act might be 
applied contrary to Article III:2 was, by itself, not sufficient to make it incon-
sistent with the General Agreement.”  Id. para. 86.  See also id. paras. 84, 85 
(discussing the excise tax and business and municipal tax, respectively).  Both 
paragraphs state the same result and rationale.     
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United States argued, inter alia, that the restrictions on im-
ports could not be defended under Article XX(b) because the 
Thai measures were not necessary to protect human health.162  
The United States asked the panel to recommend that Thailand 
eliminate its offensive restrictions and amend its tax regime to 
conform with its obligations under the GATT.163   
Thailand argued that its restrictions were justified under Ar-
ticle XX(b) because chemical and other additives contained in 
U.S. cigarettes might make them more harmful than Thai ciga-
rettes.164  Thailand also argued that the more harmful imported 
cigarettes could only be eliminated through a prohibition on 
cigarette imports and, therefore, the measure was “necessary to 
protect human health” as permitted under Article XX(b).165  Ad-
ditionally, Thailand argued that the production and consump-
tion of tobacco undermined the objectives set forth in the Pre-
amble of the GATT.  These objectives included raising the stan-
dard of living, thus ensuring full employment thus increasing 
real income and demand, and developing the full resources of 
the world.166  Thailand argued that smoking lowered the stan-
dard of living and increased illness, leading to large and unnec-
essary disbursements attributable to increased medical costs, 
which consequently reduced real income and prevented the effi-
cient use of resources.167  The United States countered that 
Thailand “could pursue the objective of seeking to prevent the 
increased number of smokers without imposing a ban on im-
ports ... through education and the recognition of the effects of 
smoking rather than restraints on the availability of ciga-
rettes.”168 Moreover, the United States responded that Thailand 
could not successfully “argue that the ban on imports was nec-
essary to protect human life or health since domestic produc-
  
 162. See id. para. 12.  Article XX(b) states in relevant part that “nothing in 
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by 
any contracting party of measures: (b) necessary to protect human ... life or 
health.”  WTO Agreement, supra note 2, Art. XX.   
 163. See Thai Cigarettes, supra note 151, para. 13.   
 164. See id. para. 14.   
 165. Id. para. 21. 
 166. See id. para. 21. 
 167. See id.   
 168. See id. para. 23.   
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tion, sales and exports of cigarettes and tobacco remained at 
high levels.”169 
The panel accepted that smoking was a “serious risk to hu-
man health”170 and that measures “designed to reduce the con-
sumption of cigarettes fell within the scope of Article XX(b),” 
which clearly permits contracting parties to give priority to 
human health over trade liberalization.171  However, this ability 
is not without limits.  The measure, even for the purpose of giv-
ing priority to human health had to be “necessary.”172  The panel 
concluded that the import restrictions imposed by Thailand 
could be considered necessary only if there were no alternative 
measures consistent or less inconsistent with the goals of the 
GATT.173  The panel then examined whether the objectives of 
the Thai government could be met through other measures 
more consistent with the GATT.174  The panel noted the strict, 
nondiscriminatory labeling and ingredient disclosure regula-
tions implemented by other governments which allowed them to 
better control the content of cigarettes and increase consumer 
awareness of the dangers associated with tobacco use.175   
The panel ultimately determined that these alternative, non-
discriminatory labeling programs may be more consistent with 
the GATT than an outright ban on cigarette importation.  These 
measures could be implemented on a national treatment176 basis 
in accordance with Article III:4 and could require complete dis-
closure of ingredients coupled with a ban on unhealthy sub-
stances.177  Another possibility suggested by the panel was a ban 
on cigarette advertising of both domestic and foreign-made 
cigarettes.178  These are some examples of “various measures 
  
 169. See id.   
 170. Id. para 73.  This conclusion was influenced by reports prepared by the 
World Health Organization, whose work created a number of recommenda-
tions designed to reduce smoking.  Id. para. 56. 
 171. See id. para. 73.   
 172. See id.   
 173. See id. para. 74.   
 174. See id. para. 77.   
 175. See id. 
 176. For a discussion of national treatment, see supra note 117 and accom-
panying text.  
 177. See Thai Cigarettes, supra note 151.   
 178. See id. para. 78.  The panel concluded that a ban on advertising would 
normally meet the requirements of Article III:4. Id.  A general ban on adver-
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consistent with the General Agreement which were reasonably 
available to Thailand to control the quality and quantity of 
cigarettes smoked and which, taken together, could achieve the 
health policy goals that the Thai government pursues by re-
stricting the importation of cigarettes inconsistently with Arti-
cle XI:1.”179 
b. Tuna/Dolphin Dispute (Tuna I)   
The U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA)180 
requires a general prohibition of the “taking” and importation of 
marine mammals into the United States.181  On August 28, 
1990, the United States imposed an embargo on imports of 
commercial yellowfin tuna and yellowfin tuna products har-
vested with purse-seine nets182 in the Eastern Tropical Pacific 
  
tising would create unequal competitive opportunities between existing Thai 
producers and new foreign producers, however, the measure would satisfy 
Article XX(b) because additional advertising rights would risk stimulating 
demand for cigarettes.  Id.  
 179. Id. para. 81.   
 180. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 
1027 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 USC).  For example, 16 
U.S.C. § 1371 provides that “there shall be a moratorium on the taking and 
importation of marine mammals and marine mammal products … during 
which time no permit may be issued for the taking of any marine mammal 
and no marine mammal or marine mammal product may be imported into the 
United States.” 
 181. See Tuna I, supra note 127, para 2.3.   
 182. Id. para. 2.1. 
A fishing vessel using this technique locates a school of fish and 
sends out a motorboat (a “seine skiff”) to hold one end of the purse-
seine net.  The vessel motors around the perimeter of the school of 
fish, unfurling the net and encircling the fish, and the seine skiff then 
attaches its end of the net to the fishing vessel.  The fishing vessel 
then purses the net by winching in a cable at the bottom edge of the 
net, and draws in the top cables of the net to gather its entire con-
tents. 
Id. 
Studies monitoring ... catch levels have sown that fish and dolphins 
are found together in a number of areas around the world and that 
this may lead to incidental taking of dolphins during fishing opera-
tions.  In the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP), a particular asso-
ciation between dolphins and tuna has long been observed, such that 
fisherman located schools of underwater tuna by finding and chasing 
dolphins….   
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Ocean.183  The United States considered the provisions of the 
MMPA to be justified under Article XX(b) because they served 
the purpose of protecting dolphin life and health and were ‘nec-
essary’ within the meaning of the provision.  The United States 
argued that with respect to the protection of dolphin life outside 
its jurisdiction, there was no alternative measure reasonably 
available to achieve this purpose.184  However, Mexico, the party 
who brought the dispute, argued that Article XX(b) was not ap-
plicable to a measure imposed to protect the life or health of 
animals outside the jurisdiction of the United States.185  Mexico 
also submitted that the import measure was not “necessary” 
because alternative means, consistent or less inconsistent with 
the GATT, were available to the United States to protect dol-
phin life.186  Mexico specifically noted international cooperation 
as a more consistent alternative action.187  
The panel concluded that even if Article XX(b) was inter-
preted to permit extrajurisdictional protection of health and 
life, the United States would not meet the requirement of ne-
cessity set out in Article XX(b).188  This failure to satisfy the Ar-
ticle XX(b) necessity requirement was because the United 
States:  
[H]ad not demonstrated to the panel - as required of the party 
invoking an Article XX exception - that it had exhausted all 
options reasonably available to it to pursue its dolphin protec-
tion objectives through measures consistent with the General 
Agreement, in particular through the negotiation of interna-
tional cooperative arrangements, which would seem to be de-
sirable in view of the fact that dolphins roam the waters of 
many states and the high seas.189   
Not only were less restrictive alternatives available, but the 
U.S. measure was also not necessary within Article XX(b).190  
The measure was deemed unnecessary because, under the 
  
Id. para. 2.2.   
 183. See id. para 2.7.   
 184. See id. para. 5.24. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See id. para. 5.28.   
 189. Id.  
 190. See id.  
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MMPA, the United States linked the maximum incidental dol-
phin taking rate which Mexico had to meet during a particular 
period as a condition for importing tuna, to the taking rate ac-
tually recorded for U.S. fisherman during the same period.191  
Thus, Mexican authorities could never predict whether, at any 
given time, their policies conformed to that of the United 
States.192  The panel found that limitations on trade based on 
such unpredictable conditions could not be regarded as neces-
sary to protect the health or life of dolphins.193  The panel’s con-
clusion was based largely on the U.S. failure to exhaust all rea-
sonably available options to pursue its dolphin protection objec-
tives.194     
c. The EC Asbestos Dispute195   
The EC Asbestos dispute provides an important component to 
the Article XX analysis and its necessity requirement.  The EC 
Asbestos dispute represents the first time both a panel and Ap-
pellate Body decision condoned a ban on imported goods pursu-
ant to Article XX(b).196  The EC Asbestos dispute concerned a 
  
 191. Id. 
 192. See id. paras. 5.28, 5.33.   
 193. See id. para. 5.28.   
 194. See id.  However, even though the U.S. measures did not pass scrutiny 
under the WTO’s DSU, with the help of subsequent international agreements, 
the amount of dolphin deaths has drastically decreased over time.  Over the 
past decade, fisherman have become significantly more proficient at catching 
yellowfin tuna without harming dolphins.  Tangled Nets, supra note 27, at 38.  
Techniques and nets have been changed to allow the mammals to es-
cape.  In 1998, an international agreement - now endorsed by the 
United States, the European Union, Vanuatu and 13 Latin American 
countries - set rules to limit dolphin death to fewer than 5,000 a year, 
a number thought to be sustainable.  Last year, out of an estimated 
population of more than 9m dolphins in the eastern Pacific, fewer 
than 1,600 died, compared with 133,000 in 1986.  
Id. 
 195. WTO Appellate Body Report on European Communities – Measures 
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (Mar. 12 2001), 40 
I.L.M. 1193 [hereinafter Asbestos AB Report]; WTO Dispute Settlement Panel 
Report on European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbes-
tos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000) [hereinafter Asbestos 
Panel Report], available at www.wto/org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/distab_e. 
htm.  
 196. Kelly, supra note 109, at 716–17. 
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French Decree prohibiting the importation of white asbestos 
from Canada due to the negative health concerns associated 
with the use of white asbestos.197  The panel held that the EC 
(defending the French Decree) made a prima facie case for the 
non-existence of a reasonably available alternative to an out-
right ban of asbestos products, and the need for substitute 
products.198  The panel gave great consideration to the com-
ments provided by experts consulted in the course of the pro-
ceeding.199   
At the Appellate Body level, Canada made four arguments.  
First, based on the scientific evidence presented, Canada ar-
gued that the panel erred in finding that asbestos and asbestos 
products pose a risk to human health.200  Second, the panel had 
an obligation to quantify the risks associated with asbestos and 
could not simply rely on the hypotheses of French Authorities.201  
Third, the panel erred by concluding that a ban was necessary 
to halt the spread of asbestos-related health risks.202  Finally, 
Canada argued that “controlled use” was a reasonably available 
alternative to the French Decree.203   
As to the first argument, the Appellate Body dismissed Can-
ada’s contention that the evidence before the panel was insuffi-
cient to support its findings.  All four scientific experts con-
sulted by the panel concurred that asbestos products “constitute 
a risk to human health, and the panel’s conclusions on this 
point are faithful to the views expressed by the four scien-
tists.”204  As to Canada’s second argument, the Appellate Body 
held that there is no requirement under Article XX(b) to quan-
tify the risk to human life or health.205  With regards to the third 
argument, the Appellate Body noted that:  
  
 197. See Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 195, paras. 2.3–5.  See also 
Kelly, supra note 109, at 717.   
 198. Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 195, para. 8.222 
 199. Id.   
 200. See Asbestos AB Report, supra note 195, para. 165.  
 201. See id.   
 202. See id.   
 203. See id.   
 204. See id. para. 166.  In addition, the carcinogenic nature of asbestos has 
been acknowledged since 1977 by international bodies.  Id.   
 205. See id. para. 167 (citing Beef Hormones Case, supra note 126, para. 
186).  The Appellate Body concluded that a risk may be evaluated either in 
quantitative or qualitative terms.  Id.   
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It is undisputed that WTO Members have the right to deter-
mine the level of protection of health that they consider ap-
propriate in a given situation.  France has determined and the 
panel accepted, that the chosen level of health protection by 
France is a ‘halt’ to the spread of asbestos-related health 
risks.206   
Accordingly, the Appellate Body found that it was “perfectly 
legitimate” for a Member to seek to halt the spread of a highly 
risky product while allowing the use of a less risky product in 
its place.207   
The fourth, and most compelling, argument made by Canada 
related to the availability of “controlled use” as an alternative 
measure.  The measures of controlled use that Canada pre-
sented were influenced by ILO Convention 162.208  These meas-
ures included: 
(i) making work in which exposure to asbestos may occur sub-
ject to regulations prescribing adequate engineering controls 
and work practices, including workplace hygiene; (ii) prescrib-
ing special rules and procedures, including the authorization 
of a competent authority in the field, for the use of asbestos or 
of certain types of asbestos or products containing asbestos or 
for certain work processes; (iii) where necessary to protect the 
health of workers and technically practicable, replacement of 
asbestos by other materials or products evaluated as harmless 
or less harmful; and, (iv) total or partial prohibition of the use 
of asbestos or of certain types of asbestos or products contain-
ing asbestos in certain work processes.209 
  
 206. See id. para. 168.   
 207. See id.   
 208. Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 195, para. 3.139 (referencing Con-
vention Concerning Safety in the Use of Asbestos).  For more information on 
the Convention Concerning Safety in the Use of Asbestos see infra note 260 
and accompanying text. 
 209. Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 195, para. 3.139.  In addition, na-
tional regulations should:  
(i) establish procedures for the notification by the employer of certain 
types of work involving exposure to asbestos; prescribe adequate en-
gineering controls and work practices to prevent or control exposure 
to asbestos; (ii) enforce laws and regulations through an adequate 
and appropriate system of inspection, including appropriate penal-
ties; (iii) prescribe limits for the exposure of workers to asbestos and 
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The Appellate Body balked at the opportunity to support unre-
stricted free trade and took a more narrow view of the term 
“reasonably available.”210  However, the Appellate Body, by in-
corporating the holdings of various other panel reports that 
struck down assorted Article XX defenses, did not provide much 
opportunity for subsequent attempts to eliminate reasonably 
available alternatives.211  Consequently, the Appellate Body held 
that an “alternative measure” is one that can achieve the same 
objective as the challenged measure but is consistent or less 
inconsistent with the GATT (and hence less restrictive).212  In 
other words, an “alternative measure did not cease to be rea-
sonably available simply because the alternative measure in-
volved administrative difficulties for the Member.”213   
The Appellate Body held that the determination of whether 
an alternative measure is reasonably available is the extent to 
which the alternative measure contributes to the realization of 
  
make employers reduce exposure to as low a level as is reasonably 
practicable; (iv) measure the concentrations of airborne asbestos dust 
in workplaces and monitor the exposure of workers to asbestos at in-
tervals; take appropriate measures to prevent pollution of the envi-
ronment; (v) ensure that employers have established policies and pro-
cedures on measures for the education and periodic training of work-
ers on asbestos hazards and methods of prevention and control; (vi) 
establish standards for respiratory protective equipment and special 
protective clothing for workers; (vii) recognize contractors qualified to 
carry out the demolition of plants or structures containing friable as-
bestos insulation materials, and removal of asbestos from buildings 
or structures; (viii) ensure that workers who are or have been ex-
posed to asbestos are provided with free medical examinations to su-
pervise their health in relation to the occupational hazard; and, (ix) 
prescribe adequate labelling of containers, including material safety 
data sheets indicating the asbestos content, the health risks and the 
appropriate protection measures concerning the materials or the 
product. 
Id. para. 3.140.   
 210. See Asbestos AB Report, supra note 195, paras. 160, 170. 
 211. See, e.g., id. para. 170 (explaining that in determining whether a sug-
gested alternative measure is reasonably available one factor that must be 
taken into account is the conclusion drawn by the Panel in Thai Cigarettes).   
 212. Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 195, para. 3.318.   
 213. Asbestos AB Report, supra note 195, para. 169 (citing Gasoline Case, 
supra note 120).   
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the end pursued.214  In this case, France claimed that the re-
striction was aimed at preserving human life and health, 
through the elimination of the well-known and life-threatening 
health risks posed by asbestos products.215  Thus, the remaining 
question would be whether controlled use would achieve the 
same end as the Decree and constitute a less restrictive trade 
measure than the Decree.  In the panel’s view, “France would 
not reasonably be expected to employ any alternative measure 
if that measure would involve a continuation of the very risk 
that the Decree seeks to halt.”216  More importantly, the panel 
noted that “even in cases where ‘controlled use’ practices are 
applied ‘with greater certainty,’ the scientific evidence suggests 
that the level of exposure can, in some circumstances, still be 
high enough for there to be a ‘significant residual risk of devel-
oping asbestos-related diseases.’”217  For these reasons, the Ap-
pellate Body upheld the panel’s finding that the EC had demon-
strated that there was no reasonably available least restrictive 
alternative to the French prohibition, and therefore, the Decree 
was necessary to protect human life or health within the mean-
ing of Article XX(b).218   
4. The Chapeau 
If the trade restriction satisfies one of the provisions set forth 
in Article XX(a–j) and the provision satisfies the nexus re-
quirement discussed above, then the final step in the analysis is 
to determine whether the measure complies with the require-
ments of the chapeau.  The chapeau conditions the availability 
of the Article XX exception by subjecting the measure to the 
requirement that: 
  
 214. Id. para. 172 (citing WTO Report of the Appellate Body, Korea – Meas-
ures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, 
WT/DS169/AB/R (Jan. 10, 2001) [hereinafter Korea Beef Dispute]).   
 215. See id.   
 216. See id. para. 174.   
 217. See id.  
 218. However, The Appellate Body’s conclusion in the EC Asbestos dispute 
did differ from that of the panel report.  Unlike the panel report, the Appellate 
Body determined that chrysotile asbestos and PCG fibres were not like prod-
ucts within the meaning of Article III:4.  See Asbestos AB Report, supra note 
195, para. 126.  However, even if they were like products, the Appellate Body 
would agree with the panel that the French Decree would satisfy Article 
XX(b).  See id. para. 175.   
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Such measures are not applied in a manner which would con-
stitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination be-
tween countries where the same conditions prevail, or a dis-
guised restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or en-
forcement by any contracting party of [the] measures [listed in 
Art. XX) (a)-(j)].219 
Therefore, the “scope for Member Countries to adopt public 
health or environmental protection measures that restrict free 
trade is limited by the prohibition on arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination and disguised restrictions on trade contained in 
the chapeau to Article XX.”220 The Shrimp Turtle dispute pro-
vides the perfect illustration of the analysis of the three re-
quirements of Article XX.   
C. The Embodiment of Article XX’s Three Requirements: The 
Shrimp Turtle Dispute 
The Shrimp Turtle dispute is a particularly telling example of 
how Article XX is applied because it contains the most detailed 
consideration of the meaning of the chapeau.221  In 1987, the 
United States issued regulations, pursuant to the 1973 Endan-
gered Species Act,222 which required all U.S. shrimp trawlers to 
use turtle excluder devices (TEDs) while fishing in areas where 
there was a possibility that shrimp trawling would interfere 
with sea turtles.223  In 1989, the United States enacted Section 
609 of Public Law 101-162224 which imposed an import ban on 
shrimp harvested with fishing techniques that may adversely 
  
 219. See WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. XX. 
 220. Bentley, supra note 147, at 112. 
 221. Shrimp Turtle AB Report, supra note 129, paras. 146–86.  The Shrimp 
Turtle dispute “stands in stark contrast to Tuna-Dolphin dispute under 
GATT.”  Kelly, supra note 109, at 711. 
 222. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 76 Stat. 884 
(1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §1531).  
 223. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 110, at 552 (providing a summary of the 
regulations promulgated under the 1973 Endangered Species Act as it existed 
in 1987). 
 224. Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiaciary, and Re-
lated Agencies Appropriations Act, 1990, Pub. L. 101-162, § 609l 103 Stat. 988 
(1989) (codified as note at 16 U.S.C.A.§ 1537) [hereinafter Appropriations 
Act].  
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affect sea turtles.225  This was followed by the U.S. Department 
of State issuance of its 1996 Guidelines which provided that, 
“all shrimp imported into the United States must be accompa-
nied by a form attesting that the shrimp was harvested either 
in the waters of a certified nation or under conditions that do 
not adversely affect sea turtles.”226 Although the United States 
legitimately sought to protect turtles by differentiating between 
shrimp caught with TEDs and those caught without TEDs, the 
WTO found that the United States violated the GATT rules.227  
The Appellate Body held that although the U.S. measure 
served a legitimate environmental objective under Article 
XX(g), the measure, as applied by the United States, consti-
tuted arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination between the 
WTO Members, and was thus contrary to the chapeau of Article 
XX.228  The Appellate Body began its analysis of Article XX’s 
chapeau by stating that: 
[In] order for a measure to be applied in a manner which 
would constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination be-
tween countries where the same conditions prevail, three ele-
ments must exist.  First, the application of the measure must 
result in discrimination.  As we stated in United States —
Gasoline, the nature and quality of this discrimination is dif-
  
 225. Id.  However, there were certain exceptions.  For instance,  
the import ban would not apply to harvesting nations that are certi-
fied as (i) having a fishing environment (e.g., lack of sea turtles or use 
of artisinal harvesting methods) which does not pose a threat of the 
incidental taking of sea turtles in the course of shrimp harvesting or 
(ii) providing documentary evidence of a regulatory program govern-
ing the incidental taking of sea turtles in the course of shrimp trawl-
ing comparable to the US program and having an average rate of in-
cidental taking of sea turtles comparable to that of US vessels.   
JACKSON ET AL., supra note 110, at 553. 
 226. Appropriations Act, supra note 224. 
 227. Kelly, supra note 109, at 711.  Although the United States subse-
quently brought its legislation into compliance, its failure to do so would have 
allowed affected nations to seek compensation from the United States for the 
cost of the ban.  Id.  Compensation could have exceeded $200 million dollars 
per year.  See Press Release, Sea Turtles Restoration Project, Environmental-
ists Blast International Trade Panel Decision Which Places Sea Turtles and 
U.S. Endangered Species Act at Risk (Mar. 19, 1998) (citing the National 
Fisheries Institute), at http://www.seaturtles.org/press_release2.cfm?pressID 
=20 (last visited Jan. 21, 2005). 
 228. Shrimp Turtle AB Report, supra note 129, para. 186.   
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ferent from the discrimination in the treatment of products 
which was already found to be inconsistent with one of the 
substantive obligations of the GATT 1994, such as Articles I, 
III or XI.  Second, the discrimination must be arbitrary or un-
justifiable in character ... Third, this discrimination must oc-
cur between countries where the same conditions prevail.... 
Thus, the standards embodied in the language of the chapeau 
are not only different from the standard used in determining 
that Section 609 is violative of the substantive rules of Article 
XI:1 of the GATT 1994.229  
Therefore, “a balance must be struck between the right of a 
Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the duty 
of that same Member to respect the treaty rights of the other 
Members.”230   
The Appellate Body found the controlling fact to be that the 
actual application of the U.S. measure which, “required other 
WTO Members to adopt a regulatory program that is not 
merely comparable, but rather essentially the same, as that ap-
plied to U.S. shrimp trawlers.”231  The Appellate Body concluded 
that, “thus the effect was to establish a rigid and unbending 
standard by which U.S. officials determined whether or not 
countries would be certified, thus granting or refusing other 
countries the right to export shrimp to the United States.”232  
The Appellate Body was unmoved by the uniform standard the 
United States imposed throughout its territory and further con-
cluded that although it might be acceptable for a government in 
establishing its domestic policy to adopt a single standard, it 
was not acceptable with regards to international trade: 
[F]or one WTO Member to use an economic embargo to require 
other Members to adopt essentially the same comprehensive 
regulatory program, to achieve a certain policy goal, as that in 
force within that Member’s territory, without taking into con-
sideration different conditions which may occur in the territo-
ries of those other Members.233 
The problem was exacerbated because there were instances 
in which shrimp caught using methods identical to those em-
  
 229. Id. para. 150 (emphasis in original).   
 230. Id. para. 156 (emphasis in original).   
 231. Id. para. 163 (emphasis in original).   
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. para. 164 (emphasis in original). 
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ployed by U.S. fisherman were excluded solely because those 
countries were not certified by the United States.234  This result 
was difficult to reconcile with the stated policy objective of the 
United States and was therefore found “unnecessary.”235 
Another problem with the U.S. measure was that the United 
States did not engage in any “across-the-board negotiations” 
with any of the other Members before enforcing the import pro-
hibition.236  The Appellate Body cited both the Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development237 and Agenda 21238 and found 
that “[u]nilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges 
outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should be 
avoided.  Environmental measures addressing transboundary 
or global environmental problems should, as far as possible, be 
based on international consensus.”239  Although one regional 
agreement with selected states existed, it alone was insuffi-
cient240 because it was clear to the Appellate Body that the 
United States “negotiated seriously with some, but not with 
  
 234. Id. para. 165.   
 235. Id.   
 236. Id. para. 166.  The Appellate Body considered these negotiations vital 
because “the protection and conservation of highly migratory species of sea 
turtles ... demands concerted and cooperative efforts on the part of the many 
countries whose waters are traversed in the course of recurrent sea turtle 
migrations.”  Id. para. 168.   
 237. Id. para. 168. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. (emphasis omitted).  Furthermore, the Shrimp Turtle Appellate 
Body report notes that:  
WTO members in the Report of the CTE, forming part of the Report 
of the General Council to Ministers on the occasion of the Singapore 
Ministerial Conference, endorsed and supported: ... multilateral solu-
tions based on international cooperation and consensus as the best 
and most effective way for governments to tackle environmental prob-
lems of a transboundary or global nature.  WTO Agreements and 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) are representative of 
efforts of the international community to pursue shared goals, and in 
the development of a mutually supportive relationship between them, 
due respect must be afforded to both.   
Id. 
 240. Id. para. 172. 
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other Members (including the appellees)” and that effect was 
“plainly discriminatory” and “unjustifiable.”241 
In order to discuss whether product labels and labeling pro-
grams may satisfy the three requirements of Article XX or, in 
the alternative, whether any other restrictive trade measure 
may pass Article XX analysis when there is a potential for the 
existence of a successful and efficient labeling program, a dis-
cussion of the GATT/WTO panel and Appellate Body reports 
that have confronted the issue of labeling is necessary.  Part V 
will explore these disputes and the requirements for labeling 
programs which have resulted from them.    
V. GATT/WTO PANELS THAT HAVE CONFRONTED THE ISSUE OF 
LABELING 
Although there have been quite a few GATT/WTO panels that 
have considered the issue of labeling, this Article will focus on 
three: (1) the Thai Cigarettes dispute; (2) the EC Asbestos dis-
pute; and (3) the Tuna I dispute.  These disputes were chosen 
because they best reflect the broad spectrum that Article XX 
was intended to cover.  The Thai Cigarettes panel preferred la-
beling as a substitute to an outright ban or other more restric-
tive trade barriers supposedly created to protect human health, 
yet the EC Asbestos panel concluded that labeling and other 
methods of controlled use are insufficient to ward off the dan-
gerous effects of asbestos on human health.  Last, in the Tuna I 
dispute, the panel decided that the labeling program, designed 
to protect the environment and wildlife, was permissible under 
the GATT.   
A. Thai Cigarettes Dispute 
As discussed earlier, the GATT panel concluded that the im-
port restrictions imposed by Thailand242 could be considered 
necessary with respect to Article XX(b) only if there were no 
  
 241. Id.  In addition, there was differing treatment of countries desiring 
certification because of the difference in the level of effort made by the US in 
transferring the required TED technology to specific countries.  Id. 
 242. The Royal Thai government placed restrictions on imports of foreign 
made cigarettes and applied disproportionate taxes on foreign made ciga-
rettes.  Thai Cigarettes, supra note 151, para. 1.  
File: Emslie MACRO 03.13.05.doc Created on:  3/14/2005 9:27 AM Last Printed: 3/14/2005 4:30 PM 
530 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 30:2 
alternative measures consistent with the GATT.243  The panel 
found that there were other measures that Thailand could in-
corporate, especially considering that contracting parties to the 
GATT may, in accordance with Article III:4 of the GATT, “im-
pose laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal 
sale, offering for sale, purchase transportation, distribution or 
use of imported products provided they do not thereby accord 
treatment to imported products less favourable than that ac-
corded to ‘like’ products of national origin.”244  In fact, as the 
panel noted, other countries have introduced strict, non-
discriminatory labeling requirements which allowed their gov-
ernments to control, and the public to be informed of, the con-
tents and hazards of cigarettes.245  Therefore, the panel decided 
that such labeling programs and dangerous content bans, im-
plemented on a national treatment basis in accordance with 
Article III:4, would be appropriate alternative measures to im-
port bans and disproportionate tax treatment that had been 
deemed inconsistent with the GATT.246 
Two factors were critical to the panel’s determination.  First, 
the panel was influenced by the testimony of World Health Or-
ganization (WHO) representatives.  The WHO made a number 
of recommendations designed to reduce smoking based on the 
findings of an expert Committee convened to study smoking 
control strategies in developing countries.247  These recommen-
dations included activities aimed at curbing the promotion and 
sale of tobacco products and a compilation of standards of con-
formity in terms of health warnings and product information to 
be used in the form of product labeling.248  Second, the panel 
noted that Thailand had already implemented non-
discriminatory controls on demand including, inter alia, warn-
ings on cigarette packs.249  Such non-discriminatory controls are 
examples of “various measures consistent with the General 
Agreement which were reasonably available to Thailand to con-
trol the quality and quantity of cigarettes smoked and which, 
  
 243. Id. para. 75. 
 244. Id.   
 245. Id. para. 77.   
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. para. 56.   
 248. Id. paras. 56, 78.   
 249. Id. 
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taken together, could achieve the health policy goals that the 
Thai government pursued by restricting the importation of 
cigarettes inconsistently with Article XI:1.”250 
The Thai Cigarettes dispute determined that a labeling pro-
gram coupled with other programs, such as advertising regula-
tions and educational programs, could be deemed a reasonable 
or feasible alternative to a trade restriction under Article XX.  
However, it is important to note that, arguably, a reasonable or 
feasible alternative under Article XX need not be in complete 
compliance with the GATT.  An alternative measure that is less 
inconsistent with the GATT than the challenge restriction may 
suffice.  However, with regards to labeling programs this dis-
tinction may be academic because, as decided in the Tuna I dis-
pute,251 labeling programs are fully consistent with the GATT. 
B. EC Asbestos Dispute 
The EC Asbestos dispute, admittedly, complicates the label-
ing solution.  This case also concerned trade restrictions de-
signed to address products that pose a risk to human health.  In 
this case, the French attempted to ban the use, production, and 
import of asbestos and asbestos products because of their ad-
verse health effects.252  The EC, on behalf of France, argued that 
because of asbestos’ carcinogenic nature,253 asbestos fibers can-
not be considered a “like product” to other fibers that do not 
share the same chemical composition as asbestos.254  However, 
the panel determined after extensive review that it was not de-
cisive that asbestos and asbestos products do not have the same 
chemical composition, nor that asbestos was “unique.”  Rather, 
the panel focused on “market access” and whether the products 
  
 250. Id. para. 81.   
 251. For a full discussion of the Tuna I dispute, see supra notes 180–194 
and accompanying text. 
 252. See generally Asbestos AB Report, supra note 195.   The health risks 
posed by contact with asbestos are mesothelioma, a cancer of the lining of the 
chest and the abdominal cavity; lung cancer; and asbestosis, in which the 
lungs become scarred with fibrous tissue.  See U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency Website, Asbestos – Asbestos in Your Home, at http://www.epa.gov/ 
asbestos/ashome.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2005).  
 253. The carcinogenicity of asbestos and its fibers has been acknowledged 
for some time by international bodies.  See Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 
195, para. 8.188. 
 254. Id. 
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have the “same applications” and can “replace” each other for 
some industrial uses.255   
However, the Appellate Body found that the panel had erred 
in its analysis.256  Their decision centered on the fact that differ-
ent products often have similar uses and, although two prod-
ucts’ end uses might be similar, their physical properties may 
be different.257  The Appellate Body therefore concluded that 
when evaluating the criterion of physical property, evidence 
relating to health risks associated with that product may be 
pertinent in an examination of ‘likeness’ under Article III:4 of 
the GATT.258 
In addition to the analysis of likeness under Article III:4, the 
EC Asbestos panel considered Canada’s argument for the use of 
labels as a least restrictive trade measure vis-à-vis the use of 
the restrictions placed by the EC.  This argument addressed the 
overall proposal by Canada of the controlled use approach.259  
Canada relied on the principles of controlled use outlined in 
ILO Convention 162.260  ILO Convention 162 included in its pro-
posal, inter alia, that national regulations should prescribe 
adequate labeling on containers, including material safety data 
sheets indicating the asbestos content, the health risks and the 
appropriate protection measures concerning the materials of 
the product.261  It is important to stress that Canada’s argument 
was not for a labeling program per se; instead, it argued for the 
principle of controlled use, which included the implementation 
of a labeling program.   
The panel concluded that controlled use would not be rea-
sonably available or feasible to the EC.262 Although it was possi-
ble to apply controlled use successfully “upstream” (mining and 
manufacturing) or “downstream” (removal and destruction), 
controlled use could not be applied to the building sector and 
  
 255. Id.  See also Vogt, supra note 3, at 7. 
 256. See generally Asbestos AB Report, supra note 195.   
 257. Id. para 112.  See also Vogt, supra note 3, at 7.   
 258. Vogt, supra note 3, at 7–8. 
 259. Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 195, para. 3.139.   
 260. Convention Concerning Safety in the Use of Asbestos, June 24, 1986, 
International Labour Organization, ILO 86B09.316 ENGL, recommendation 
(ix), available at http://www.ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/english/convdisp2.htm [herein-
after ILO Convention 162].  
 261. Id.   
 262. Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 195, para. 8.212.   
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was, therefore, not a true alternative measure.263  Therefore, the 
difficulties of applying controlled use to these sectors made such 
a program inadequate in relation to the decree’s policy objec-
tives.264   
This decision may rest on the fact that the exposure to dan-
gerous asbestos and asbestos products is not restricted exclu-
sively to workers who consistently use the products or to those 
people responsible for its disposal.265  In fact, asbestos may pose 
a risk to people in the general work area, as well as to spouses 
of exposed workers.266  Moreover, as one of the experts who pre-
sented at the panel illustrated, exposure to asbestos may be the 
result of pure chance.267  This observation is corroborated by the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).268  The EPA ex-
plains that asbestos can be found in a variety of household 
items including steam pipes, boilers, furnace ducts, resilient 
floor tiles, cement sheet, decorative material sprayed on walls, 
patching and joint compounds, roofing, shingles, and siding.269  
If these items are disturbed, even by an individual involved in 
home improvements, they may damage health.270 
Can the Thai Decree and the French Decree be reasonably 
distinguished even though one panel found that labeling and 
similar programs were feasible alternatives to the Thai Decree, 
but the other held that labeling and controlled use was not a 
feasible alternative to the French Decree?  The following may 
help explain the reasoning.  Arguably, a distinction may be 
drawn between the underlying products in the two disputes.  
  
 263. Id. para. 8.209.  The panel noted that the building sector was one of the 
areas more particularly targeted by the measure contained in the decree.  Id. 
para 8.212. 
 264. Id. para. 8.209.  
 265. Id. para. 8.215.   
 266. Id.   
 267. Id. para. 8.215 n.185 (discussing the examples of the lecturer and the 
fireman mentioned by Dr. Henderson during the meeting with experts).   
 268. See generally U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Website, supra 
note 252.  
 269. Id. 
 270. Id.  However, “[m]ost people exposed to small amounts of asbestos, as 
we all are in our daily lives, do not develop these health problems.”  Id.  Even 
still, if the home-improver is interested or required to disturb products con-
taining asbestos, the EPA encourages the use of a trained expert in asbestos-
removal.  Id.   
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Although both products are clearly injurious to health, the 
products are used and distributed differently and, therefore, the 
effectiveness of a labeling program would differ for each prod-
uct.  One would assume that cigarette smokers typically pur-
chase packs of cigarettes for themselves for personal use.  
Therefore, a cigarette user would see the warnings on the pack.  
On the other hand, asbestos and asbestos products are likely to 
harm more than just the user of the product.  Had the panel or 
the Appellate Body found that controlled use was a feasible al-
ternative to the French Decree and a labeling program was cre-
ated, the program would likely have proven ineffective.  Con-
sider the situation of a builder using ceiling products containing 
asbestos.  If the label was on the asbestos product itself, the 
builder would be cautioned on the effects of asbestos use.  How-
ever, that would not adequately protect the homeowner, who 
may later install a ceiling fan and become exposed to asbestos 
dangers.   In this example, a labeling program would not work 
to warn all those who may be exposed to the hazardous product.  
Surely, one could make a similar argument for cigarettes in 
that cigarette users are not the only people who are endangered 
by cigarette smoke, as evidenced by the growing studies on the 
danger of second-hand smoke.271  A label on the cigarette pack, 
which the non-smokers do not have contact with, will not ade-
quately alert non-smokers to the dangers of inhaling second-
hand smoke.  Thus, the Thai government could have argued 
that labeling alone could not be deemed a feasible alternative 
because it does not protect the non-smoking population from the 
dangers of cigarette smoke.  This concern may have played a 
role in the Thai Cigarette panel’s determination that a labeling 
program alone would not be a feasible alternative.  Rather, the 
labeling program needed to be coupled with other programs 
such as a restriction on advertising and/or educational pro-
grams.  Such programs should help offset the dangers of second-
hand smoke.  Based on the results in the Thai Cigarettes and 
EC Asbestos disputes, a labeling program alone may not be a 
  
 271. See, e.g., EPA Website, Smoke-free Homes:  Secondhand Smoke Can 
Make Children Suffer Serious Health Risks, at http://www.epa.gov/smokefree/ 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2005).  See also Environmental Tobacco Smoke Related 
Links, at http://www.epa.gov/ebtpages/airindoorenvironmentaltobaccosmoke. 
html (last visited Jan. 23, 2005) (providing studies about the dangers of sec-
ond-hand smoke). 
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reasonable and feasible alternative to a defending party’s trade 
restriction if it is designed to protect human health under Arti-
cle XX(b)’s necessary requirement.272  
C. Tuna I Dispute 
The Tuna I dispute is a famous case, largely because of the 
press coverage that it received and the U.S. public support be-
hind the dolphin-safe labels at issue in the case.273   It involved a 
challenge to the U.S. Dolphin Protection Consumer Information 
Act (DPCIA), which provided a labeling standard for any tuna 
product exported from, or offered for sale, in the United 
States.274  Any producer, importer, exporter, distributor, or seller 
of tuna or tuna products who labeled the product “Dolphin Safe” 
or included any other term falsely suggesting that the tuna was 
fished using a method that was not harmful to dolphins violated 
the statute.275  Mexico argued that the labeling requirements of 
the DPCIA were marking requirements within the scope of Ar-
ticle IX:1.276  The panel disagreed because the DPCIA’s labeling 
provisions did not restrict the sale of tuna products.  Tuna 
products could be sold freely with or without the Dolphin Safe 
label, and the provisions did not establish threshold require-
  
 272. Recall that Article XX(b) requires that the trade restriction be “neces-
sary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.”  WTO Agreement, su-
pra note 2, art. XX(b) (emphasis added).   
 273. See Tangled Nets, supra note 27, at 38 (discussing the difficulty of sell-
ing tuna that is not dolphin-safe in the United States despite increased de-
mand for tuna products). 
 274. Tuna I, supra note 127, para. 2.12 (referencing Dolphin Protection 
Consumer Information Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1385(d) (1990)).  Tuna products in-
clude any food product containing tuna processed for retail sale, except per-
ishable items with a shelf life of fewer than three days. 16 U.S.C. § 1385(c)(5). 
 275. Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, 16 U.S.C. § 
1385(d)(1)(1990).  This requirement is applicable if the tuna was fished in 
either of two situations: (1) in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean by a fishing 
boat using purse-seine nets which do not meet the U.S. requirements of being 
dolphin safe, or (2) fished on the high seas by a fishing boat through drift net 
fishing.  Id. § 1385(d)(1)(A)&(B).  Violators are subject to civil penalties.  Id. § 
1385(e). 
 276. Tuna I, supra note 127, para. 5.41.  Article IX:1 provides that “[e]ach 
contracting party shall accord to the products of the territories of other con-
tracting parties treatment with regard to marking requirements no less fa-
vourable than the treatment accorded to like products of any third country.” 
WTO agreement, supra note 2, art. IX:1.   
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ments that must be met in order to obtain an advantage to the 
United States.277  The labeling provision, therefore, “did not 
make the right to sell tuna or tuna products, nor the access to a 
government-conferred advantage affecting the sale of tuna or 
tuna products, conditional upon the use of tuna harvesting 
methods.”278  Hence, the only remaining issue was whether the 
DPCIA met the requirements of Article I:1.279   The panel found 
that the controlling fact was that  
[U]nder United States customs law, the country of origin of 
fish was determined by the country or registry of the vessel 
that had caught the fish; the geographical area where the fish 
were caught was irrelevant for the determination of origin.  
The labelling regulations governing the tuna caught in the 
ETP thus applie[d] to all countries whose vessels fished in this 
geographical area and thus did not distinguish between prod-
ucts originating in Mexico and products originating in other 
countries.280 
The panel concluded that, for these reasons, the DPCIA and its 
labeling requirements were not inconsistent with the obliga-
tions of the United States under Article I:1.281  Therefore it is 
now safe to conclude that labeling requirements similar to the 
DPCIA are not inconsistent with the GATT generally.   
  
 277. Tuna I, supra note 127, para. 5.42 (“Any advantage which might possi-
bly result from access to this label depends on the free choice by consumers to 
give preference to tuna carrying the ‘Dolphin Safe’ label.”).   
 278. Id. 
 279. WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. I:1.  Article I:1 provides that:  
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or 
in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the in-
ternational transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with re-
spect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with re-
spect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and 
exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 
2 and 4 of Article III any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity 
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or des-
tined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and un-
conditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the ter-
ritories of all other CONTRACTING PARTIES. 
Id.   
 280. Tuna I, supra note 127, para. 5.43.   
 281. Id.  
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The above cases support the general proposition that labeling 
programs are consistent with GATT/WTO rules, although they 
may not always be a reasonable alternative to other measures.  
Moreover, these cases provide a framework for determining 
what attributes and characteristics a labeling program must 
possess in order to satisfy Article XX analysis.  Further, pursu-
ant to these cases, a labeling program that possesses these at-
tributes and characteristics may in fact be considered the least 
restrictive trade measure available to a defending trading 
Member.  However, this ability may, in fact, be a double-edged 
sword.  If a labeling program satisfies Article XX analysis, it 
may be found to be the least restrictive trade measure com-
pared to other measures available to a defending nation.  This 
available alternative may stymie other restrictive trade meas-
ures that the defending trading member is considering or has 
implemented under Article XX.  Such a result is possible be-
cause, as discussed previously in Part IV of this Article, the 
nexus requirement of Article XX mandates that a Member may 
not adopt a measure inconsistent with the GATT if an alterna-
tive measure is available which is not inconsistent, or is less 
inconsistent, with other GATT provisions, and is as effective as 
the more restrictive measure.  A labeling program which pos-
sesses the attributes and characteristics discussed in the next 
part of this Article may fill this role in many situations.   
VI. MAY LABELING PROGRAMS DEVELOP INTO A CATCHALL 
LEAST RESTRICTIVE TRADE MEASURE? 
The development of labeling programs, their successes (both 
real and potential), and the relative acceptance of these pro-
grams by GATT/WTO panels, raises the question of whether 
labeling programs may develop into a catchall least restrictive 
trade measure for the purpose of Article XX analysis.  If that 
were to be the case, then if the possibility of a labeling program 
exists, other trade measures may not survive the nexus re-
quirement of Article XX.   Given the successes of labeling pro-
grams in the past,282 the potential for greater successes in the 
  
 282. For example, the amendments to the Clean Air Act in the United 
States have been successful in establishing U.S. compliance with the Montreal 
Protocol.  See Staffin, supra note 3, at 211–12.   
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future,283 and the legality of labeling programs under Art. III:4 
of the GATT,284 labeling programs may potentially trump other 
challenged restrictions under Article XX.  This is particularly 
true because it is difficult to conceptualize other trade measures 
that would be less restrictive than a labeling program.  How-
ever, recent decisions by the GATT/WTO suggest that proposed 
labeling programs must have certain attributes, abilities and 
conditions in order to be reasonably considered a least restric-
tive trade measure.   
A.  How Such a Labeling Program Would Need to Function   
It is possible that successful labeling regimes could become 
reasonably available alternative measures285 to many other 
more restrictive trade measures proposed by trading members 
seeking an Article XX defense.  This may be an attractive route 
for Members challenging a trade restriction, chiefly because an 
alternative measure can only be ruled out if it is shown to be 
impossible to implement.286  Moreover, an alternative measure 
does not cease to be reasonably available simply because it 
would involve administrative difficulties.287  However, it must be 
reasonably available, meaning it must contribute to the realiza-
tion of the end pursued288 and, last, it absolutely must not in-
volve a continuation of the very risk that the challenged restric-
tion seeks to combat.289  A successful labeling program could 
  
 283. For a discussion of the advantages of labeling programs, see supra Part 
II.C. 
 284. The Thai Cigarettes panel held that labeling programs are consistent 
with Art. III:4 so long as the regulations and restrictions placed on imported 
products treat the latter no less favorably than like products of national ori-
gin.  See Thai Cigarettes, supra note 151, para. 75.  Therefore, it stands to 
reason that, if the requirements of a labeling program are applied equally to 
imported products and products of national origin, the labeling program re-
quirements are consistent under Art. III:4.   
 285. A reasonably alternative measure is one that can achieve the same 
objective as the challenged measure, but is consistent or less inconsistent with 
the GATT (and hence less restrictive).  See Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 
195, para. 3.318.   
 286. See Asbestos AB Report, supra note 195, para. 169 (citing Gasoline 
Case, supra note 120).  
 287. Id.  
 288. Id. para. 172 (citing Korea Beef Dispute, supra note 214).   
 289. Id. para. 174.   
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surely act as a least restrictive alternative in many circum-
stances; recent panel and Appellate Body decisions have estab-
lished standards and qualifications for such acceptable labeling 
programs.   
1. The Labeling Program Must Be Effective 
In order for the labeling program to be a reasonably available 
alternative measure under Article XX, the label must be “effec-
tive,” which means it must be both informative and credible.  In 
the Thai Cigarettes dispute, the panel held that nondiscrimina-
tory labeling and ingredient disclosure regulations were rea-
sonably available least restrictive trade measures, making the 
measures instituted by the Thai government overly restrictive 
and therefore unnecessary.290  These alternative labeling re-
gimes would not have been reasonable alternatives had they 
failed to “contribute to the realization of the end pursued.”  
However, the panel found that the labeling regulations were a 
reasonably available alternative under Article XX because the 
labeling and disclosure regulations were effective measures and 
were used successfully by other countries to reduce smoking 
and its harmful effects.291   
In addition, it would be prudent to augment a labeling pro-
gram’s effectiveness by coupling it with other successful meas-
ures.  For example, the Thai Cigarettes panel suggested educa-
tion,292 a ban on unhealthy substances,293 and a ban on advertis-
ing.294  However, such measures must apply to both foreign and 
domestic products equally in order to meet the requirements of 
Art. III:4.295  These supplemental steps will likely raise the effec-
tiveness of a labeling program, thus helping it rise to the level 
of an effective alternative measure.   
Unfortunately, the threshold level of a label’s effectiveness 
has not yet been established by a panel or an Appellate Body.296  
  
 290. Thai Cigarettes, supra note 151, para. 77. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. para. 80.  
 293. Id. para. 77. 
 294. Id. para. 78.   
 295. Id. para. 78 n.1.   
 296. With the exception of Thai Cigarettes, GATT/WTO panels have not 
measured a label’s effectiveness.  Although the label placed on tuna fish was 
scrutinized in Tuna I, the issue in that case was whether the label was consis-
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But, the cases suggest that the required level of effectiveness 
might be relatively low.  For instance, in the Thai Cigarettes 
dispute, the panel held that labels could be a reasonably avail-
able alternative under Art. XX, yet there was evidence that the 
Thai government had already implemented non-discriminatory 
controls including, inter alia, warnings on cigarettes packs.297  
These controls were implemented prior to the establishment of 
the challenged restrictive measures at issue in the dispute.298  
Consequently, the panel did not investigate how effective the 
non-discriminatory controls (i.e., the warnings on the cigarette 
packs) must be to rise to the level of a reasonably available al-
ternative.  If so, the panel could have determined that the ciga-
rette warnings, which arguably were ineffective, were not a rea-
sonable alternative to the Thai Decree.  Therefore, the required 
level of a labeling program’s effectiveness may not be relatively 
high.  However, in the Thai Cigarettes dispute, there was also 
evidence presented by WHO which suggested that labeling pro-
grams, coupled with other measures, could be effective in reduc-
ing the harmful effects of tobacco use.299   
The EC Asbestos dispute stands for the proposition that the 
effectiveness of the alternative measure must be real and not 
just a mere possibility.  Both the panel and the Appellate Body 
held that controlled use, which would include a labeling pro-
gram, would not meet the goal sought by the French Decree.  
Taken together, the decisions in the Thai Cigarettes and EC 
Asbestos disputes may stand for the proposition that although 
the alternative trade restriction does not have to be completely 
effective, it must be reasonably effective.  Moreover, simply be-
cause controlled use was not an available alternative to the 
French decree, it does not automatically follow that the French 
Decree was the least restrictive measure.   
At first glance, the EC Asbestos decision may be seen as a 
limitation to both labels and the notion of controlled use.  Many 
observers could conclude that the panel and Appellate Body de-
cided as they did because asbestos is simply too dangerous for a 
  
tent with Art. I:1 of the GATT, not whether it was a reasonably available al-
ternative measure under Art. XX.  See Tuna I, supra note 127, para 5.43.   
 297. Thai Cigarettes, supra note 151, para. 78.   
 298. Id.   
 299. Id. para. 56.   
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controlled use program.  However, this reason misses the im-
portant point that for a label to be effective it must reach the 
end user or persons at risk.  This requirement is especially true 
in situations where the label serves as a warning rather than as 
a simple information source.  Therefore, a labeling program 
would not work in situations where the label or warning is not 
read or observed by the end user of the product. For example, a 
label placed on commercial food might not be effective.  Suppose 
that the production of truffle oil involved socially unfriendly or 
unsafe procedures.  The label on the bottle explaining such pro-
cedures should notify those who keep truffle oil at home.  How-
ever, most people experience the enjoyment of truffle oil while 
dining at restaurants, and a label on the bottle of truffle oil at a 
fancy restaurant would not reach the consumer at table six.  
Likewise, a label on the fertilizer bag used to treat a soccer field 
would not serve as a warning for the players but would only 
alert the groundskeeper.  However, sometimes the strategic 
placing of the label would cure this problem.  For instance, the 
groundskeeper of the soccer field might place a sign on the side-
lines of the field, thus alerting end users of the danger.  Of 
course, the effectiveness of the label or labeling program not 
only augments the program’s ability to satisfy the requirements 
set forth by the discussed cases, it also increases the chances of 
satisfying its paramount goal, i.e., the promotion of healthy, 
environmentally-friendly, or socially-conscious products. 
2.  The Importance of International Support or Agreement 
International support, agreement, or evidence of interna-
tional negotiations should increase the legitimacy of a labeling 
program, thereby increasing its effectiveness.  However, 
GATT/WTO panels and Appellate Bodies have also suggested 
that such a feature may actually be a requirement for a meas-
ure requiring an Article XX defense.  For example, the Tuna I 
panel required the United States to first exhaust all options 
reasonably available to it before seeking to invoke an Article XX 
exception.  In particular, the panel looked to see if the United 
States had entered into any negotiations or international coop-
erative arrangements.300  Therefore, international agreement or 
  
 300. Tuna I, supra note 127, para. 5.28. 
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negotiations may be required or, at the very least, considered 
an important element to any proposed labeling program.   
International acceptance of the measure was also investi-
gated in the Thai Cigarettes dispute, where the regulatory pro-
grams instituted by other Members clearly influenced the 
panel’s decision.301  Additionally, the recommendation of the 
WHO was given great weight by the panel.302  Similarly, in the 
Shrimp Turtle dispute, the Appellate Body’s decision was influ-
enced by the fact that the United States did not engage in any 
“across-the-board negotiations” before enforcing their restrictive 
provision;303 instead, the Appellate Body found that the negotia-
tions were impermissibly selective because the United States 
negotiated seriously with some countries and not with others.304  
The Appellate Body concluded that “[e]nvironmental measures 
addressing transboundary or global environmental problems 
should, as far as possible, be based on international consen-
sus.”305 
At the very least, the above decisions may require acceptance 
of a labeling program’s effectiveness on an international level.  
It is important to emphasize that a labeling program must be 
reasonably effective and available to be the least restrictive 
trade measure.  If the labeling program is time-tested in other 
countries or is recommended by international organizations, 
then it is more likely to be found a reasonably effective alterna-
tive measure.  However, it is questionable under these disputes 
whether labeling programs that are new and untested will meet 
the requirements of being reasonably effective.   
3.  The Labeling Program Must be Fair 
A labeling program instituted by one trading Member must 
be fair to all other trading Members.  A labeling program must 
be fair because, as the Appellate Body in the Shrimp Turtle dis-
pute concluded, under the chapeau of Article XX “a balance 
must be struck between the right of a Member to invoke an ex-
ception under Article XX and the duty of that same Member to 
  
 301. Thai Cigarettes, supra note 151, para. 77.   
 302. See id. para. 56.   
 303. Shrimp Turtle AB Report, supra note 129, para. 166. 
 304. Id. para. 172.   
 305. Id. para. 168.   
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respect the treaty rights of other Members.”306 Further, the Ap-
pellate Body held that although it might be acceptable for a 
government in establishing its domestic policy to adopt a single 
standard, it is not acceptable with regard to international trade 
“for one WTO Member ... to require other Members to adopt es-
sentially the same comprehensive regulatory program, to 
achieve a certain policy goal...without taking into consideration 
different conditions, which may occur in the territories of those 
other Members.”307 
Therefore, the Shrimp Turtle decision may require the Mem-
ber instituting the labeling program to consider the capabilities 
of developing nations.  The requirements of a labeling program 
cannot be unattainable to other Members such that compliance 
would be impossible and, in effect, would result in a trade ban 
on the products of that country.  This requirement is consistent 
with Article III:4, which provides that a Member can regulate 
the products bought and sold in its territory; however, foreign 
and domestic goods, which are considered alike, must be treated 
similarly.308  The real issue, which is beyond the scope of this 
Article, is how far this requirement should be taken.  It is rela-
tively simple to imagine a situation where a surmountable re-
quirement for a product in a developed nation could seem im-
possible for a developing nation to implement.309  It is unclear 
whether such a situation would inhibit the formulation of a la-
beling requirement.  Although industry is far more sophisti-
cated in a developed nation, it seems unlikely that the require-
ment of a label on a product would be considered too great a 
burden on a developing nation.   
However, if the label requires certain content, then the pro-
gram may be seen as a disguised restriction on trade and, thus, 
impermissible.  However, in such a situation the issue would 
likely be addressed when applying the chapeau.  In other words, 
  
 306. Id. para. 156. 
 307. Id. para. 164. 
 308. See WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. III:4.   
 309. For example, one trading Member may require that if a product does 
not contain an ingredient that can only be obtained through a domestic pro-
ducer for an economically unfeasible amount, then the product’s label must 
read “Obnoxious Waste” or “The Modern Day Lead Paint.”  Such a require-
ment would make it impossible for the producer to meet the requirement and 
the label would destroy the hope of selling any of the product in that country.   
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the challenge would be that the label is a disguised restriction 
or trade barrier because the label requires that the product it-
self meet certain qualifications.  Such a requirement, however, 
is entirely different than simply requiring a label with the sole 
purpose of conveying information.   
The Tuna I panel held that a labeling program possessing 
certain attributes complies with the GATT Agreement.  Yet, the 
role labeling programs play in international law is incomplete.  
More specifically, labeling programs could develop into a default 
least restrictive trade measure to other challenged trade re-
strictions.  The existence, or potential existence, of a labeling 
program may provide an attacking Member with additional ar-
guments to challenge other restrictive trade measures.  Any 
given attacking Member could argue that most, if not all, re-
strictive trade measures fall short of satisfying the “necessary 
requirement” under Art. XX due to the existence of the least 
restrictive alternative labeling program.   
Therefore, a defending Member may be forced to defend its 
trade restriction under not only the GATT, but also from the 
argument that an existing or obtainable labeling program, as 
the least restrictive measure, should be implemented in its 
stead.  As such, labeling programs could act as “catchall” least 
restrictive trade measures under WTO jurisprudence.  Such an 
opportunity was present and successfully raised by the United 
States in the Thai Cigarettes dispute.   
The increased use of labeling programs in international trade 
will support such arguments in the future.  In turn, future 
WTO panel and Appellate Body decisions that support the use 
of labeling programs will sustain the use and international ac-
ceptance of labeling programs in general.  Consequently, it is 
imperative that labeling programs incorporate the required at-
tributes set forth by the aforementioned cases.  Hence, labeling 
programs should diligently implement all steps necessary to 
ensure that the program is effective, international support or 
agreement of its effectiveness and relevance exists, and its re-
quirements are fair.  Prospective WTO decisions supporting the 
use of labeling programs will only increase the clout of such 
programs, hopefully resulting in decreased environmental dam-
age and human health risks.    
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VII. CONCLUSION  
The development and use of labeling programs in interna-
tional trade is rapidly increasing.  These programs have many 
advantages and some disadvantages.  In the near future, label-
ing programs may change the face of Article XX analysis in the 
WTO.  Disputes involving labeling programs are increasing in 
stature and frequency in the WTO dispute panels.  A Member 
seeking to defend a challenged restriction under Article XX 
may, at some point in the future, be required to defend its re-
striction both from the challenge of the attacking Member and 
from the argument that a labeling program would be a reasona-
bly available alternative measure.  This contention would be 
especially true if the labeling program was found to be effective, 
agreeable to the international community or accepted in an in-
ternational agreement, and reasonably fair to all trading mem-
bers.   
 
